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To survive and adapt in an ever-changing world, we continuously sample our 
surroundings through our senses. To make correct inferences about the causes of sensory 
signals, it is essential to learn not only about the entities present around us, but also about 
the reliability of sensory information itself. The influential Bayesian brain hypothesis 
proposes that perception is an inferential process, depending not only on sensory data, 
but also on beliefs about the probable causes of sensory data. Over time, the brain arrives 
at estimates of what to expect and how much to rely on prior beliefs and sensory data in 
an environment. Feedback from the environment improves learning, thereby helping the 
brain to arrive at these estimates.  
Now what will happen if the environmental feedback becomes unreliable? 
Providing unreliable feedback has previously been shown to impair task performance and 
increase pattern perception in noise. However, the mechanistic understanding about its 
underlying processes is currently limited. In this thesis, we explored the effects of 
unreliable feedback within the framework of Bayesian inference. We predicted that 
unreliable feedback would induce beliefs about the reliability of sensory information and 
lead the brain to down-weigh sensory data. To test this, we conducted two studies 
comprising visual orientation detection or discrimination tasks: Study I comprised two 
behavioural experiments and a simulation, and Study II comprised a neuroimaging 
experiment with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We hypothesised that in 
both studies, the sensory data would be down-weighed after an unreliable feedback phase 
in which invalid feedback was given in half of the trials. As a result, we predicted that task 
performance would deteriorate. In Study I, we also predicted that in the presence of prior 
beliefs – induced by predictive cues on each trial – perceptual inference would shift 
towards the priors, leading to a higher number of cue-congruent responses. Further, 
simulations – which followed the experimental design of Study I – were performed to 
predict behaviour as a result of unreliable feedback. In one of the behavioural 
experiments of Study I, we additionally measured the confidence placed on responses in 
order to study changes in metacognitive awareness of performance. In Study II, we 
investigated whether the sensory data representations in the primary visual cortex (V1) 
deteriorate as a result of unreliable feedback. Reliable, correct feedback was used as a 




Data from both studies demonstrated that performance did indeed decrease 
following unreliable feedback compared to reliable feedback. Moreover, observers 
increasingly relied on prior information as the feedback about their percepts became 
unreliable. At the neural level, fMRI showed that low-level stimulus representations 
deteriorated in V1 with unreliable feedback. To sum up, our results show that inducing 
beliefs about the reliability of sensory information by manipulating performance 
feedback can systematically influence perceptual inference and that these changes 






















Um in volatilen und dynamischen Lebensumwelten zu überleben, erforschen wir unsere 
Umgebung kontinuierlich mithilfe unserer Sinnesorgane. Um verlässliche Rückschlüsse 
auf die Ursachen sensorischer Signale zu ziehen, ist es wichtig, nicht nur die uns 
umgebenden Entitäten zu lernen, sondern auch die Zuverlässigkeit der sensorischen 
Informationen selbst zu kennen. Laut der „Bayesian Brain“-Hypothese ist Wahrnehmung 
ein inferentieller Prozess, der nicht nur von sensorischen Daten abhängt, sondern auch 
von Vorannahmen über wahrscheinliche Ursachen sensorischer Daten. Im Laufe der Zeit 
lernt das Gehirn dabei einzuschätzen, inwieweit es sich auf Vorannahmen und 
sensorische Daten in einer Umgebung verlassen kann. Feedback aus der Umgebung 
verbessert das Lernen und hilft dem Gehirn, diese Schätzungen zu präzisieren.  
Was passiert nun, wenn solches Feedback unzuverlässig ist? In vorherigen 
Arbeiten wurde gezeigt, dass unzuverlässiges Feedback die perzeptuelle Genauigkeit 
beeinträchtigt und Fehlwahrnehmungen in Rauschsignalen erhöht. Das mechanistische 
Verständnis über die zugrundeliegenden Prozesse ist jedoch derzeit sehr limitiert. 
Untersuchungsgegenstand der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, die Auswirkungen von 
unzuverlässigem Feedback im Rahmen der Bayesischen Inferenz zu untersuchen. Unsere 
Hypothese war, dass unzuverlässiges Feedback unsere Einschätzung der Zuverlässigkeit 
sensorischer Informationen beeinflusst und dazu führt, dass sensorische Daten im 
Inferenzprozess weniger stark gewichtet werden. Hierzu wurden zwei Studien mit 
visuellen Reizen durchgeführt: Studie I umfasste zwei Verhaltensexperimente und eine 
Computersimulation; Studie II umfasste ein Experiment mit funktioneller 
Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRT). Unter der Annahme einer Abwertung sensorischer 
Information infolge unzuverlässigen Feedbacks wurde eine Verringerung der 
perzeptuellen Leistung vorhergesagt. In Studie I wurde zusätzlich prognostiziert, dass 
sich bei Vorliegen von Vorannahmen über wahrscheinliche Wahrnehmungsinhalte – 
experimentell induziert durch prädiktive Hinweise –, die Wahrnehmungsinferenz in 
Richtung dieser Vorannahmen verschieben würde, was sich in einer höheren 
Wahrscheinlichkeit hinweis-kongruenter Antworten niederschlagen würde. Beide 
Effekte wurden auch mithilfe einer Simulation analog zum experimentellen Design der 
Studie I untersucht. In einem der Verhaltensexperimente der Studie I wurde zusätzlich 




metakognitiven Bewusstsein nachzugehen. Auf neuronaler Ebene wurde schließlich in 
Studie II untersucht, ob sich sensorischen Datenrepräsentationen im primären visuellen 
Kortex (V1) als Folge unzuverlässigen Feedbacks verschlechtern würden. In allen 
Experimenten wurde in einer Kontrollbedingung zuverlässiges Feedback gegeben.  
Die Ergebnisse beider Studien zeigen, dass die perzeptuelle Leistung nach 
unzuverlässigem Feedback im Vergleich zu einer Bedingung mit zuverlässigem Feedback 
abnimmt. Darüber hinaus verließen sich die Probanden zunehmend auf Vorannahmen 
über Wahrnehmungsinhalte. Auf neuronaler Ebene zeigte sich eine zunehmende 
Verrauschung sensorischer Repräsentationen in V1 als Folge von unzuverlässigem 
Feedback. Zusammenfassend zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Induzierung von 
Überzeugungen über die Zuverlässigkeit sensorischer Informationen durch 
manipuliertes Leistungsfeedback einen systematischen Einfluss auf perzeptuelle Inferenz 











































We have evolved to live in a complex and dynamic environment, where adaptation is 
critical to survival. Here, the ability to identify salient information in the surroundings 
based on knowledge about the world is a potent adaptive tool for all species. We seldom 
see objects in their entirety but perceive them as wholes nevertheless. This is because we 
perceive our surroundings based on not only our sensory input, but also prior knowledge 
about their probable causes. This idea has been best formalised under the influential 
Bayesian inference theory. First proposed by Hermann von Helmholtz in 1867, this theory 
– then called “unconscious inference” – proposes that our percepts depend not only on 
sensory information, but also on prior knowledge and expectations. The balance between 
these two sources of information is vital, and has been explored in several studies not only 
of the healthy brain, but also to understand disorders including schizophrenia, anxiety, 
depression, visual neglect and autism (Karvelis, Seitz, Lawrie, & Seriès, 2018; Parr, Rees, 
& Friston, 2018; Paulus & Yu, 2012; Sterzer et al., 2018). The extent to which we rely on 
sensory inputs and prior knowledge depends critically on their reliability too. For 
instance, we trust our visual inputs more during the day than at night. This is not only 
because it is much harder to see at night, but also because our visual input depends more 
on subjective factors such as the light source (e.g.: moonlight, streetlight, light from 
incoming vehicles on the road etc.). We often use prior knowledge to navigate in such an 
environment; but in addition, critical teaching signals are provided by the consequences 
of our action or feedback – for instance, feedback is provided by the feeling under our feet 
as we walk (somatosensory feedback), how a target changes as we approach it (visual 
feedback) or even what an observer tells us about our position and gait (verbal feedback). 
Thus, feedback can be a useful tool to study the dynamics between prior beliefs and 
sensory information under conditions of uncertainty. 
  
1.1.1. Feedback and learning 
Feedback is ubiquitous in the real world and guides perception and subsequent action. 
For example, it is well-known that feedback is used to improve precision of our own 
actions  (Fulvio & Rokers, 2017; Scott, 2004; van Vugt & Tillmann, 2015). As per the Law 




reinforced when they were followed by “a satisfying state of affairs” and weakened if  they 
were followed by “an annoying state of affairs”. Thus, positive feedback reinforces the 
behaviour that leads to it and negative behaviour discourages it. Importantly, feedback – 
irrespective of its salience – reduces uncertainty, and its informational value is further 
highlighted by the increased brain activity in the caudate nucleus and the ventral striatum 
(Lempert & Tricomi, 2015), brain regions that have been previously associated with 
reward prediction errors (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Pagnoni, Zink, Montague, & Berns, 2002; 
Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). 
Numerous studies have shown that feedback improves perceptual performance, 
especially when the task at hand is demanding (Herzog & Fahle, 1997; Liu, Lu, & Dosher, 
2010, 2012). Perceptual learning has been proposed to be a type of reward-based 
learning, where although feedback is not necessary, it has informational value (Lempert 
& Tricomi, 2015) and can improve perception and learning (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, 
& Morgan, 1991; Herzog, Aberg, Frémaux, Gerstner, & Sprekeler, 2012; Petrov, Dosher, & 
Lu, 2006; Seitz, Nanez, Holloway, Tsushima, & Watanabe, 2006). The brain areas that 
respond to cognitive feedback were also found to be largely the same as those involved in 
reward-based learning (Daniel & Pollmann, 2010).  Feedback-related negativity (FRN), 
the electro-encephalographic (EEG) signature of negative performance feedback, encodes 
the feedback prediction error (Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham, & Cools, 2010; 
Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2011; Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & Endrass, 
2014) and is sensitive to the salience (good vs. bad) of outcomes, not its magnitude 
(Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006). Further, its amplitude has been shown to be 
proportionate to the probability of error correction (de Bruijn, Mars, & Hester, 2019) .  
Thus, existing studies indicate that cognitive feedback plays an important role in guiding 
learning. 
 
1.1.2. Feedback validity and learning 
Owing to its immense importance in perception and learning, the reliability or validity of 
feedback is critical. Previous studies have shown that feedback that was uncorrelated 
with performance could slow down learning or induce aberrant pattern perception in 
noise or noisy images. Different mechanisms have been proposed for this. One such 




where when individuals are unable to gain a sense of control objectively, they desire more 
structure, and this results in a greater propensity to see structure in noise (Vannucci, 
Mazzoni, & Cartocci, 2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). The aforementioned studies did 
not observe a change in the overall error rate, but rather a higher rate of pattern 
identification in noisy images. Further, in these studies, independent tasks with different 
stimuli were used to induce LOC and to measure its effects on perception. Hence, a top-
down intervention is likely to have influenced perception. Other studies have used two-
choice identification tasks where participants had to identify either the offset direction of 
visual Vernier stimuli (Aberg & Herzog, 2012; Herzog & Fahle, 1997, 1999) or detect the 
presence of anomalous notes in melodies (Vuvan, Zendel, & Peretz, 2018). These studies 
showed that unreliable feedback decreases task performance across time or relative to 
reliable feedback, and that it could change the perceptual decision threshold. Contrary to 
these negative effects, a third set of studies showed that manipulating feedback could 
sometimes be beneficial. For instance, providing feedback with a positive bias could 
improve performance, since learning rates were to be boosted by the larger performance 
gradient given by the positively biased feedback (Shibata, Yamagishi, Ishii, & Kawato, 
2009). In another study, providing fake feedback about stimuli that were not presented 
led to perceptual learning – indicating that feedback can facilitate learning purely based 
on top-down signals (Choi & Watanabe, 2012). 
Thus, previous studies have manipulated feedback in different ways to study 
different aspects of perception and top-down learning.  All of them are likely to have led 
to some kind of uncertainty, but random feedback (that has only a chance probability of 
being correct) simulates uncertainty about sensory data the most, since as we have seen 
above, any biased information was quickly learnt and was used to perform better in that 
situation. The studies that provided random feedback have shown either (1) an increased 
pattern perception without a change in overall performance or (2) a reversible 
deterioration in task performance. In this thesis, we attempt to provide a mechanistic 
understanding about how the perceptual inference adapts in a volatile environment by 
systematically providing unreliable, random feedback and by measuring its subsequent 





1.2. Theoretical framework 
The goal of this thesis was to explain how perception shifts in a volatile environment as 
simulated by random, unreliable feedback. Such feedback would have no directional bias, 
discouraging potential response biases and learning strategies. In two-choice tasks, 
unreliable feedback would mean that valid feedback should be delivered in 50% of the 
trials and invalid feedback in the other 50% of trials. Thus, incorrect as well as correct 
choices (responses) would have equal probabilities of being followed by positive or 
negative feedback, which might make sensory data look less useful and could potentially 
lead to it getting down-weighed. In order to study this process, we mainly use two 
methodological approaches: (1) the Bayesian brain hypothesis to study changes on 
perceptual decisions especially in presence of prior beliefs, and (2) stimulus 
representations in sensory areas of the brain. Additionally, we studied changes in 
subjective awareness of performance as a result of unreliable feedback by means of 
confidence ratings about perceptual choices.  
 
1.2.1. Bayesian inference and feedback 
Perception has been proposed to be a Bayesian inferential process and hence depends 
both on the incoming sensory information and prior beliefs. The resultant posterior 
distribution determines the perceptual outcome (Hohwy, 2012; O’Reilly, Jbabdi, & 
Behrens, 2012).  
This idea is named after Bayes’ theorem on conditional probability, where the 
probability of an event is weighted by the prior knowledge about it. In an analogous 
manner, the incoming sensory signals are weighted by our prior knowledge about the 
probability of its occurrence. In Bayesian terms, the incoming sensory information is 
called the likelihood of the data given the hypothesis, whereas the prior is the probability 
of the hypothesis itself. The final percept corresponds to the probability of the hypothesis, 
given the data, and this is called the posterior probability. These three can be represented 
as probability distributions, based on the samples acquired over time. In the earlier 
example of navigating at night, in order to estimate the probability of an obstacle on the 
path, the likelihood would, for instance, be the probability of visually spotting an obstacle 




the obstacle, i.e., P(O). The posterior would be the probability of the obstacle given the 
visual information or P(O|V). In Bayesian inference, P(O|V) is related to the prior and the 
likelihood as follows: 
𝑃(𝑂|𝑉) ∝ 𝑃(𝑉|𝑂) ∗ 𝑃(𝑂)    (1.1) 
The influence of likelihood and prior on the posterior, which in turn influences both the 
perceptual decisions and updates the prior, depends on two critical characteristics of the 
two probability distributions – namely their means (µ) and variances (v), also known as 
their first and second moments, respectively. In particular, the lower the variance of a 
distribution, the higher the precision (1/v) of that distribution – and consequently, higher 
is its contribution to the posterior. For instance, if the sensory data varied very little over 
time, the corresponding likelihood probability distribution would have low variance and 
would consequently have a larger influence on the posterior. 
In the real world, the brain continuously learns from the surroundings, thus 
updating the priors about sensory information as well as how much to weigh sensory data 
and prior beliefs. These weights in turn correspond to the precision, or the inverse of the 
variance, of the respective probability distributions (Adams, Stephan, Brown, Frith, & 
Friston, 2013; Knill & Pouget, 2004). Feedback helps us to arrive at the precise estimates 
of the moments of the distributions (means and variances) corresponding to each source 
of information. When feedback is manipulated by providing random feedback in half of 
the trials, data points are misclassified in half of the trials, i.e., several wrong data points 
are included in each stimulus distribution. As a result of this, the perception and 
consequently decisions about stimuli would get noisier, thus not only slowing, but also 
potentially impairing learning. Under such conditions, priors could potentially become 
relatively more salient. 
These questions were probed in Study I. As part of Study I, two behavioural 
experiments consisting of visual orientation detection and discrimination tasks coupled 
with probabilistic priors were performed. In addition, a simulation was performed to 







1.2.2. Sensory representation in the brain 
Theories of precision-based prediction error (Adams et al., 2013)  propose that the 
prediction error, i.e., the difference between predicted and actual sensory data, is 
weighted by its precision before being used to update the knowledge about stimuli, or 
prior. This is analogous to the precision of the likelihood distribution in classical Bayesian 
inference, since in both cases, the posterior is shifted in proportion to the precision of the 
sensory evidence or the residual signal that is not “explained away” by the top-down 
expectation (den Ouden, Daunizeau, Roiser, Friston, & Stephan, 2010).  
We predicted that unreliable feedback would lead the brain to down-weigh 
sensory data in a top-down manner, and that as a result of this, the representational 
accuracy of stimulus information in the sensory areas would decrease. Previous studies 
have shown that higher sensory uncertainties induced by directly varying the signal 
contrast or signal-to-noise ratio can deteriorate multivariate representations of stimuli in 
the sensory areas of the brain (Darcy, Sterzer, & Hesselmann, 2019; Hebart, Donner, & 
Haynes, 2012; Ludwig, Sterzer, Kathmann, & Hesselmann, 2016; Tong, Harrison, Dewey, 
& Kamitani, 2012). However, it has been shown that prior beliefs about stimuli can also 
influence activity and stimulus representation in the early and intermediate-level visual 
areas (Den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh, & Stephan, 2008; Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 
2013; Kok, Brouwer, Gerven, & Lange, 2013; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; Schmack et al., 
2013). Yet another study has shown that likelihood uncertainty activated sensory areas 
whereas prior uncertainty activated higher brain areas (Vilares, Howard, Fernandes, 
Gottfried, & Kording, 2012). Further, attention has been long known to enhance brain 
activity in sensory areas (Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999; 
Kastner, Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1998; Moran & Desimone, 1985; Roelfsema, 
Lamme, & Spekreijse, 1998; Treue & Trujillo, 1999). Thus, activity and representations in 
the sensory cortex are influenced both by sensory uncertainty and the top-down 
processes.  
Based on these observations, we designed Study II to investigate the effects of 
unreliable feedback on stimulus representations in the sensory cortex, by means of an 





1.2.3. Metacognitive awareness  
Metacognitive awareness about perceptual performance refers to the awareness about 
one’s own performance. This is typically measured using confidence ratings on each trial 
(Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Stankov, 2000; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Confidence 
ratings are known to increase in proportion to the task performance accuracy as well as 
the differences between the sensory stimuli being compared (Daniel & Pollmann, 2012; 
Guggenmos, Wilbertz, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2016; Peirce & Jastrow, 1884; Vickers, 2014).  
As discussed in Section 1.1.1. (p.6-7), external feedback guides learning, although 
it is not necessary. Recently, a few studies have shown that in the absence of external 
feedback, confidence additionally functions as reinforcement signals and guides learning 
(Daniel & Pollmann, 2012; Guggenmos et al., 2016; Hebart, Schriever, Donner, & Haynes, 
2016). On the flip side, imprecise feedback has been shown to affect the precision of 
confidence – for instance, participants have been shown to be overconfident about their 
own relative to others‘ performance when noisy (but unbiased) feedback was provided 
(Grossman & Owens, 2010).  
Since metacognitive awareness of performance has been shown to decrease along 
with task difficulty as well as uncertainty, the delivery of unreliable feedback would likely 
decrease confidence, as was shown in a previous study (Vuvan et al., 2018). An alternate 
possibility is that confidence would not decrease in line with the predicted decrease in 
precision of sensory data (Section 1.2.1., p.10). This would result in a relative 
overconfidence that would then accompany the decisional shift towards prior beliefs. 
Overconfidence about prior beliefs is typical in perceptual disorders with impaired 
bottom-up sensory processing such as schizophrenia (Balzan, 2016; Köther et al., 2012; 
Moritz et al., 2014).  
To understand the effects of unreliable feedback on subjective awareness, 







As discussed in Section 1.1.2. (p.7–8), previous studies have shown that manipulating 
feedback validity could increase pattern perception, impair learning and confidence, shift 
decision criteria or even improve performance.  However, the underlying mechanism 
could have varied depending on stimuli, task demands and the way in which feedback was 
manipulated. 
 The goal of this thesis is to induce an uncertain state by delivering unreliable 
performance feedback in perceptual tasks and to study its effect on perceptual inference 
using behavioural and neuroimaging techniques. To study the effects of unreliable 
feedback, we use two-choice visual detection or discrimination tasks, and provide 
feedback that is valid at chance-level, i.e., 50%. As a control condition, we used reliable 
feedback which was 100% valid. To avoid carryover effects between the two types of 
feedback (reliable/ unreliable) in these experiments, the control session was performed 
during a separate session (day) either by the same participants (Study I) or by a different 
groups of participants (Study II).  
 In both studies, unreliable or reliable feedback was provided in dedicated 
“intervention” phases. The sustained effects of feedback manipulation were measured in 
“test” phases, which preceded and followed each intervention phase. A key aspect to 
ensuring successful feedback manipulation was for it (the manipulation) to not be too 
obvious to participants. To this end, the valid and the invalid feedback trials were 
interspersed randomly in the intervention phases with unreliable feedback. In addition, 
the perceptual tasks were moderately difficult and the stimuli were set to a task difficulty 
of 80% at the beginning of an experimental session. The performance threshold was not 
set to a higher difficulty level to avoid a floor effect. In Study I, the difficulty was adjusted 
by varying the signal-to-noise ratio of visual gratings in detection (experiment 1) and 
discrimination (experiment 2) tasks, and priors were induced using probabilistic cues. In 
Study II, a different orientation discrimination task was used while brain images were 
acquired using fMRI. The stimuli consisted of high-contrast visual gratings, and task 
difficulty was adjusted by varying the deviation of the gratings from the two diagonal 
reference orientations. In order to measure the changes in metacognitive awareness, 
confidence ratings were collected in addition to perceptual choices in experiment 2 of 




the behavioural effects of unreliable feedback observed in the two experiments of Study I 
were replicated using simulations. 
 The effect of unreliable feedback relative to reliable feedback was measured by 
comparing task performances (Studies I and II), the cue-congruence of responses (Study 
I), the stimulus representations in primary visual cortex (Study II) and the metacognitive 
awareness of performance (Study I). In both the studies, the primary goal was to study 
how these variables changed between pre- and post-intervention phases in the unreliable 
feedback sessions compared to the reliable feedback sessions. 
 
1.4. Hypotheses 
We predicted that unreliable feedback would exacerbate the uncertainty about sensory 
data, since feedback was often incongruent to the responses. In Bayesian terms, unreliable 
feedback decreases the precision of stimulus distributions, leading the brain to down-
weigh sensory information and up-weigh prior information, and consequently shifting the 
posterior distribution – and consequently perception – towards prior beliefs. 
Behaviourally, this predicts a higher number of errors in perception and a higher number 
of prior-congruent responses. Further, we predicted that down-weighing sensory 
information would decrease the precision of sensory representations in early sensory 
areas. Lastly, we predicted that the self-rated confidence, a measure of subjective 
awareness of performance, would also decrease in line with objective performance.  
 
The primary hypotheses are formulated more specifically below: 
(1) Unreliable feedback leads to a decrease in task performance accuracy (Study I, 
experiments 1,2 and simulations; Study II) 
 
(2) Unreliable feedback shifts perceptual inference away from sensory data and 
towards learned priors (Study I, experiments 1,2 and simulations) 
 
(3) Unreliable feedback deteriorates stimulus representations at early stages of visual 





In addition, there was an additional, exploratory hypothesis, which is given below: 
(4)  Unreliable feedback decreases the metacognitive awareness of one's own 
performance (Study I, experiment 2) 
 
 

























2. Study I: Sustained Effects of 
Unreliable Feedback on 









The work presented here has been published as: 
• Varrier, R. S., Stuke, H., Guggenmos, M., & Sterzer, P. (2019). Sustained effects of 











According to the Bayesian brain hypothesis, perception is an inferential process, and is 
the result of the integration of probability distributions representing our prior beliefs 
(“prior”) and new sensory evidence (“likelihood”) (Hohwy, 2012; O’Reilly et al., 2012). 
The balance between the prior and the likelihood is thought to be dynamically adjusted 
as we continuously update our estimates about their reliability (Adams et al., 2013; Knill 
& Pouget, 2004). Feedback aids learning by providing the outcomes of responses, 
especially when the task is challenging (Herzog & Fahle, 1997; Liu et al., 2010, 2012). In 
this study, we sought to investigate the effects of the reliability of feedback on Bayesian 
perceptual inference.  
Previous studies have already shown that perception was negatively affected when 
unreliable feedback, i.e., feedback that is not correlated with performance, was delivered 
in visual tasks. Relative to reliable feedback, task performance often decreased in two-
choice decision-making tasks with visual or auditory stimuli (Aberg & Herzog, 2012; 
Herzog & Fahle, 1997, 1999; Vuvan et al., 2018). Further, unreliable feedback also led to 
higher pattern perception in object-naming tasks that used noisy images (Vannucci et al., 
2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). These findings can be understood within the perceptual 
inference framework. For instance, repeatedly misclassifying stimuli would reduce the 
precision of the likelihood distributions of sensory data, as a result of which the task 
performance would deteriorate. This in turn would make the brain up-weigh available 
prior information, making them relatively more precise. Consequently, perceptual 
inferences shift towards priors, leading to heightened pattern perception in noise when 
asked to identify objects. Since these studies did not have clearly defined priors, 
participants are likely to have used priors about objects learnt over the course of life. 
Our goal in this study was to investigate how unreliable feedback would influence 
perceptual inference when probabilistic beliefs about the stimuli are induced during the 
experimental session. We contested that when unreliable feedback (sometimes correct, 
sometimes incorrect) gets delivered repeatedly to the same sensory data, its 
representations become corrupted or less precise. Consequently, perceptual inference 
would shift towards available priors. The compensatory role of priors as a result of 




feedback uncertainty in a visuo-motor task led to a stronger influence of prior beliefs on 
behaviour (Körding & Wolpert, 2004).  
Metacognitive awareness of performance, typically measured using confidence 
ratings, is a well-known indicator of one’s awareness of their own performance. A 
previous study showed that unreliable feedback could impair self-rated confidence 
(Vuvan et al., 2018). In this study, as a secondary research question, we also investigated 
the changes in confidence as a result of unreliable feedback. 
This chapter describes two behavioural experiments and a simulation. A key 
aspect of our investigation was to deliver unreliable feedback on perceptual performance 
when only the sensory evidence (and no additional predictive information) was available, 
and to then measure its effects in subsequent runs where two sources of information were 
provided on each trial – (1) a learned predictive cue inducing a prior belief and (2) the 
actual sensory evidence. The experiments used challenging visual detection (experiment 
1) and discrimination (experiment 2) tasks. Each participant took part in two 
experimental sessions (Figure 2.1, p.20). In the “Intervention” runs of each session, 
participants received either unreliable feedback (valid in one half of the trials and faulty 
in the other half) or reliable feedback (valid in all of the trials). The session with reliable 
feedback interventions served as the control session. The sustained effects of these 
interventions were measured in “Test runs” that were interleaved between the 
intervention runs. In the test runs, probabilistic cues were presented before each 
stimulus. The test runs received reliable feedback on both the sessions. 
Lastly, computer-generated simulations of unreliable feedback were implemented, 
and their effects on perception was measured thereafter. The simulations followed the 
design of the behavioural experiments and consisted of intervention and test “runs” with 
unreliable/reliable feedback and predictive cues, respectively. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis 
We reasoned that unreliable feedback on perceptual performance would lead to 
erroneous updating of likelihood distributions, rendering them more imprecise over time. 
Therefore, our hypotheses were that, as a result (1) task performance would decrease, 




reliance on this information. Further, in experiment 2, we had the exploratory hypothesis 
that confidence would decrease as a result of unreliable feedback, in parallel with 
performance. 
 
2.3. Behavioural experiments 
2.3.1. Materials and methods 
As both experiments were very similar in experimental design, they are described 
together here, and distinctions are made wherever the methodology differed. 
 
2.3.1.1. General study design 
In both the experiments, each participant took part in two sessions on separate days – one 
session consisted of intervention runs with unreliable feedback, and the other 
correspondingly had reliable feedback (Figure 2.1a, p.20). Thus, the only difference 
between the two sessions was the presence of unreliable feedback in the intervention 
runs of one session and reliable feedback in the corresponding intervention runs of the 
other session. The order of sessions was counter-balanced across participants. 
Each session started with preliminary training runs to facilitate learning of the 
priors, which was then followed by the threshold estimation runs in order to set the 
perceptual threshold for the main experiment. This was then followed by the main 
experiment, comprising intervention runs to deliver unreliable (or reliable) feedback 
regarding the perceptual choice, and test runs to measure the sustained effects of the 
unreliable (or reliable) feedback interventions (Figure 2.1b-c).  
 
2.3.1.2. Timeline of an experimental session 
Each session lasted for about two hours, including the time taken for the breaks, task 
instructions, training, threshold estimation and debriefing besides the main experiment. 
The main experiment (four test runs and three intervention runs, Figure 2.1c) lasted for 




each intervention run lasting for approximately 9 minutes. Participants were encouraged 
to take short breaks between runs in order to minimise the effects of fatigue on behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. (a) Each participant took part in two sessions, one with unreliable and one with reliable 
feedback. (b) Each session consisted of three parts: training, threshold estimation and the main experiment. 
(c) The main experiment comprised four test runs interleaved with three intervention runs. The 




The study was approved by the ethics committee at Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, 
and informed consents were collected from all participants. All the methods were carried 
out in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations. 37 participants (six male, 
ages 27.7±5.9) took part in experiment 1, three of whom had to be excluded due to 
technical difficulties (i.e. final N = 34). A different group of 32 participants (seven male, 
ages 24.75±3.6) took part in experiment 2. In both the experiments, every participant took 
part in two sessions corresponding to unreliable and reliable feedback. The mean time 
between the two sessions were 1.94 days (SD = 1.98 days) in experiment 1 and 1.7 days 







Images were constructed from an overlay of annular gratings and noise images (Figure 
2.2a, p.22). Annular gratings at an orientation of 45° counterclockwise or clockwise (the 
latter only for experiment 2) were generated such that the spatial frequency of the 
gratings would be 0.87 cycles/degree, the inner diameter of stimuli 9.94° and the outer 
diameter 20.93°. Noise images were generated by performing spatial smoothing of a two-
dimensional annular noisy patch of the same inner and outer diameters as that of the 
gratings. Next, based on a previous study with noisy gratings (Guggenmos et al., 2016), 
the grating and noise images were combined in the following manner for all the test and 
intervention runs of the main experiment (Figure 2.1c, p.20) :  
 𝑰 = 0.5 (1 + 𝑤𝑠 ∙ 𝑮 + 𝑤𝑛 ∙ 𝑵)                                             (2.1) 
where G and N were two-dimensional matrices consisting of the grating and smoothed 
noise images respectively, scaled to the interval [−0.5, 0.5], and I was the resultant image 
matrix. Parameters ws and wn were signal and noise weights respectively. The parameter 
wn was maintained at a constant value of 0.25 across subjects and sessions, and ws was set 
based on the signal threshold s (in percent) estimated prior to the main task for each 
participant during each session as follows:  
𝑤𝑠 = 𝑤𝑛 ∙  
  𝑠
100 − 𝑠
 .                                                                    (2.2) 
 
2.3.1.5. Cues 
Auditory pure tones of high and low frequencies (1000Hz and 300Hz respectively) 
adjusted for loudness were used as cues, in line with previous studies that used audio-
visual associative learning cues to study the influence of priors on behaviour (Iglesias et 
al., 2013; Kok et al., 2012; Schmack, Weilnhammer, Heinzle, Stephan, & Sterzer, 2016) . 
On each trial, a cue tone was played for 300ms, and after a brief interval (1000ms in 
experiment 1, 500ms in experiment 2), the visual stimulus was presented. The tones were 
probabilistically coupled to stimuli of one type in 75% of the trials and with stimuli of the 
other type in 25% of the trials. The type of cue-stimulus association (type 1: 
HighTone/Stim1 and LowTone/Stim2; type 2: HighTone/Stim2 and LowTone/Stim1) 




participants. Participants were instructed to pay attention to the tones in the runs that 
had them; they were told that these could be helpful. Participants were not informed as 
to how useful the cue would be or whether the cue-stimulus association would change 
over time. This was to be learnt by them over the course of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: (a) Visual stimuli (CCW: counter-clockwise, CW: clockwise), (b) response options, (c) visual 
feedback, and (d-e) trials in cued and un-cued runs (i.e., test and intervention runs, respectively) for the 
behavioural experiments. R= reliable feedback (valid in 100% of trials), UR = unreliable feedback (valid in 







Trial-by-trial visual feedback was delivered at the centre of the screen, in line with 
previous studies that have used colour-coded or symbolic cues (Been, Jans, & De Weerd, 
2011; Lempert & Tricomi, 2015; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). An upward-pointing 
green triangle indicated a correct response and a downward-pointing red triangle 
indicated an incorrect response (equilateral triangles with 0.78° edges, see Figure 2.2c, 
p.22). In runs with unreliable feedback (i.e., intervention runs in the session with 
unreliable feedback), the presentation of the red/green triangles was pseudo-
randomised, such that in half of the trials of each stimulus type, the feedback delivered 
was faulty.  
 
2.3.1.7. Experimental procedure 
The task was implemented using PsychToolbox 3.0.11 (psychtoolbox.org) on a computer 
screen (resolution: 1280x960 pixels, refresh rate: 60 Hz) placed 46 cm away from the 
chinrest, where the participant was positioned. Participants were instructed to fixate at 
the centre of the screen throughout the experiment, where a black dot (radius: 0.34° 
visual angle) was presented at all times except during feedback delivery, when the 
feedback (Figure 2.2c, p.22) replaced the dot. In experiment 1, the participants’ task was 
to report the presence or absence of gratings using the left and right arrow keys on a 
standard German keyboard. In experiment 2, the task was to report both the perceived 
orientation of gratings and the confidence about the response on a linear visual analogue 
scale using a single mouse-click (Figure 2.2b right, p.22). The left and right halves of this 
scale corresponded to the perception of counter-clockwise and clockwise perception of 
gratings, respectively. The distance from the centre (white circle) indicated confidence, 
i.e., responses that were closer to the left and right tips of the scale indicated high levels 
of confidence about the respective percept, and those near the centre indicated low levels 
of confidence. It was not possible to click at the centre of the response bar, forcing 
participants to indicate a decision about the orientation to proceed. To minimise the 
effects of fatigue or laziness on confidence ratings, the initial position of the cursor was 
random on each trial. To reduce reporting errors in confidence, time restriction was not 





2.3.1.8. Time course of a session 
Each session consisted of three parts: training, threshold estimation and the main 
experiment (Figure 2.1b, p.20). These parts are described below.  
(i) Training:  In this part, an association was induced between auditory cues and visual 
stimuli. To facilitate this associative learning, supra-threshold stimuli (12% signal) 
were presented, and reliable feedback was given. There were three runs in the 
training phase, and each run consisted of 48 trials. The time-course of a trial in the 
training runs was similar to those of the test runs in the main experiment (Figure 
2.2d, p.22). 
 
(ii) Threshold estimation: A staircase procedure was used to determine the percentage 
of signal (grating) required to attain a performance level of 80% correct responses. 
To estimate the signal threshold s (see equation 2.2, p.21), a 2-down-1-up staircase 
procedure with two phases was performed before each session with a step-size 
down/step-size ratio of 0.5548 (Garcı́a-Pérez, 1998; Guggenmos et al., 2016). The 
first phase was to determine the approximate signal threshold and had larger step-
sizes (1% signal up, 0.5548% signal down). The second phase started at the 
threshold estimated by the first staircase and had smaller step-sizes (0.5% signal 
up, 0.2774% signal down). No auditory cues were presented during the staircase, 
but reliable feedback was provided. In experiment 1, the first and the second phases 
of the staircase proceeded until a certain number of reversals were attained (8 and 
10 for phases 1 and 2, respectively), or 80 trials were completed. The signal 
threshold was determined based on the signal levels at which the last 4 reversals 
occurred in the second phase. Experiment 1 showed that six reversals were 
sufficient to arrive at the threshold signal. We therefore confined threshold 
estimation to six reversals in experiment 2, while keeping everything else the same 
as in experiment 1. 
 
(iii) Main experiment: The main experiment in both the sessions comprised seven runs 
in total (Figure 2.1c, p.20). In all of them, visual stimuli were presented at the 80% 
performance threshold determined in the previous step. The test runs served to 
probe the sustained behavioural changes resulting from feedback manipulation. 




comprising predictive cues and reliable feedback (Figure 2.2d, p.22). In the 
intervention runs, either unreliable (50% valid) or reliable feedback (100% valid) 
was delivered. Feedback reliability was the same across the three intervention runs 
within a session. An intervention run consisted of 128 trials (Figure 2.2e, p.22). In 
experiment 2, at the end of each run, participants were asked to rate their 




At the end of the second session in both the experiments, participants were asked to fill a 
short questionnaire, which consisted of questions about their awareness of having 
received unreliable feedback. The relevant questions are written below (verbatim). 
Questions (iii) and (iv) were added to the questionnaire after experiment 1 (i.e., only in 
experiment 2), to get a more quantitative estimate of feedback manipulation awareness. 
 
(i) How did you find the feedback (helpful/ confusing/ no difference etc.)?  
a. On Day 1: 
b. On Day 2:  
 
(ii) Did you notice anything odd about the feedback? If so, on which session/ day did you 
notice it? 
 
(iii) How reliable (correct) was the feedback? (0=absolutely not reliable (correct), 
100=totally reliable (correct)) 
a. On day 1:  0% ---------------------------------------------------------------------------100% 
b. On day 2:  0% -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100% 
 
(iv) During the experiment, did you think that the feedback was manipulated? Please circle 
your response 
a. On day 1: Definitely yes/ highly likely / maybe / highly unlikely/ definitely not 






2.3.1.10. Motivation ratings 
After each run in the main experiment (Figure 2.1c, p.20) in experiment 2, participants 
were asked to rate their motivation on a scale from 0 to 100 (0% = not motivated at all, 
100% = fully motivated).  
 
2.3.1.11. Eye-tracking 
To ensure fixation, a video-based eye-tracker (Cambridge Research Systems, UK; 
sampling rate: 250 Hz; spatial accuracy: 0.05°) was used throughout the experiment. A 
region of interest with radius 15mm (1.87°) was defined around the fixation. If the 
detected gaze position was outside this region, the trial would not start, and as a 
cautionary note to the participant, the fixation dot () would switch to a ring () of the 
same radius until gaze was returned to the fixation area. After stable fixation for 700ms, 
another 300ms interval followed, after which the auditory cue or visual stimulus was 
presented, depending on the run type. Fixation was monitored during the presentation of 
the visual stimuli as well in the test runs. In case the fixation was broken, (1) stimuli 
disappeared and (2) the fixation dot was replaced by a ring () at the centre, like the 
fixation check at the onset of each trial. 
 
2.3.2. Data Analysis 
2.3.2.1. Responses 
The collected responses were binary in experiment 1 and continuous in experiment 2 
(Figure 2.2b, p.22). Thus, responses in experiment 1 were stored as integer values 1 and 
2 corresponding to the two percepts. On each trial in experiment 2, the response was 
stored as a decimal value within the interval [–1, 1], where the sign (– /+) indicated 
whether the grating was perceived to be tilted counter-clockwise or clockwise, and the 
absolute value indicated confidence, with higher values indicating greater confidence. It 
was not possible to click near the centre of the response bar in the interval [–0.03, 0.03]. 





2.3.2.2. Dependent variables 
In order to test the main hypotheses, two dependent variables were computed for each 
test run: (1) performance accuracy, measured by the percentage of correct responses and 
(2) cue-congruent behaviour, measured by the cue-congruence index (CCI) which is 
defined below. Due to the correlation between stimuli and cues in the test runs (co-
occurrence in 75% of the trials), a decrease in performance would be paralleled by a 
decrease in cue-congruence. To get a measure of cue-congruence that does not depend on 
this performance-related change, we computed the percentage of correct responses (CR) 
separately for cue-congruent (CC) and cue-incongruent (CI) trials within a run, and then 
defined CCI as a difference between them: 
𝐶𝐶𝐼 = 𝐶𝑅𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝑅𝐶𝐼                                                              (2.3) 
Thus, cue-congruence, or CCI, increases if the performance in CC trials increases relative 
to that of CI trials. The upper bound for CCI is 100, and we would get this if cue-congruent 
responses were made on each trial. Similarly, a CCI value of 0 would indicate that 
performance was the same in congruent and incongruent trials – conveying that the cue 
had no influence on responses. 
 Next, in order to understand the overall changes in performance and cue-
congruence across the test runs within a session, we fitted linear functions across time for 
each dependent variable and session, resulting in two slopes each for performance and 
cue-congruence per participant.  
 To study changes in subjective ratings of confidence in experiment 2, mean 
confidence was computed for each run, and then slopes of confidence were computed for 
each session and for each participant. 
 Since responses in both the behavioural experiments were un-speeded (i.e., 
participants were instructed to be as accurate as possible) and since experiment 2 used a 
continuous response scale in which the location of a bar had to be accurately adjusted (to 








2.3.2.3. Statistical analysis 
Our hypotheses were tested by means of two-way repeated measures analyses of variance 
(RM-ANOVAs) of the run-wise estimates of each dependent variable (i.e., performance 
and CCI). There were two within-subject factors, namely, feedback type (fbtype – 
unreliable/reliable) and time (test run number - 4 levels). The changes across time within 
the two sessions were compared using the linear interaction analysis measured by means 
of ANOVA contrasts with linear weights. The sequence of sessions (a binary value 
indicating whether unreliable feedback was delivered in the first or second session) and 
the cue-stimulus association type (types 1 or 2, indicating different combinations of cues 
and stimuli, see Section 2.3.1.5., p.21 for details) were included as between-subject 
factors, and the duration between sessions (number of days) was included as a between-
subject covariate. One-sample t-tests of the session-wise slopes were also performed 
separately for the unreliable and reliable feedback sessions to understand the nature of 
changes across time (positive and negative slopes to indicate linear increases and 
decreases across time within a session, respectively). In experiment 2, additionally, the 
changes in mean confidence were studied using the same analyses. Lastly, to examine the 
common mechanisms underlying the two experiments (which were similar in design, but 
differed in the stimuli and response types, see Figure 2.2a-b on p.22), a post-hoc RM-
ANOVA was performed on the pooled dataset with experiment number (i.e., 1 or 2) as an 
additional between-subject factor. IBM SPSS Statistics 23 and MATLAB R2013b were used 
for all statistical analyses.  
 
2.3.2.4. Post-hoc analyses 
We performed additional post-hoc analyses to test for relationships between the main 
effects of interest (decrease in performance and increase in CCI) and two subjective 
factors: one, the awareness of feedback manipulation and two, motivation scores (only 
experiment 2). To estimate the effects of interest, changes in performance and CCI were 
quantified as slope differences (δPerf. slope and δCCI slope), defined as the differences between 
slopes for the unreliable and reliable feedback sessions for each variable. A third post-hoc 
test was performed to verify that the initial cursor position (which was randomly assigned 




(i) Awareness of feedback manipulation: Based on the answers to the debriefing 
questions, the awareness of feedback manipulation was encoded for each participant 
as either 0 (completely unaware, always trusted feedback), 0.5 (partially aware, 
noticed some oddity in feedback) or 1 (completely aware, realized that the delivered 
feedback was sometimes faulty). In both experiments, Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients were computed between the awareness of feedback manipulation and the 
differences (unreliable – reliable) between session-wise slopes of performance (δPerf. 
slope) and CCI (δCCI slope) separately. 
 
(ii) Motivation ratings (experiment 2 only): The percentage ratings of motivation in the 
test runs were fitted with linear functions separately for each test session, and slopes 
were compared using a paired t-test. Next, a slope difference (δMotiv. slope) was 
computed between the unreliable and reliable feedback sessions. Correlation 
analyses were performed between this slope difference and analogous slope 
differences in performance and CCI (δPerf. slope and δCCI slope) using Pearson’s 
correlation. 
 
(iii) Initial position of the cursor (experiment 2 only):  To test whether the initial position 
of the cursor in the response bar (Figure 2.2b, p.22) could have influenced 
participants’ responses, two tests were performed.  
 
a. Overall correlation: The overall correlation between the initial cursor positions 
and participants’ responses (i.e., their final cursor positions) was computed for 
each participant after pooling the data across sessions and test runs. This was then 
Z-transformed and tested for significance using a one-sampled t-test.  
 
b. Correlation across time: To test whether correlations could have emerged during 
the experiment, correlations between the initial cursor positions and the 
responses or final cursor positions were computed separately for each test run and 
session, and then Z-transformed. The resultant Z-scores were then analysed using 
a two-way RM-ANOVA with the same within-subject and between-subject factors 






The present study tested two main hypotheses and one secondary hypothesis about the 
sustained effects of unreliable feedback on perceptual decisions in a visual task (delivered 
in dedicated intervention runs). The main hypotheses were that in the test runs following 
the delivery of unreliable feedback, which also consisted of probabilistic priors, (1) task 
performance would deteriorate, and (2) responses would shift towards prior beliefs. The 
secondary hypothesis was that the metacognitive awareness, measured as self-rated 
confidence in responses, would deteriorate along with the impairment in perceptual 
inference. 
 
2.3.3.1. Unreliable feedback impairs task performance 
The critical analysis to assess the sustained effects of unreliable feedback on performance 
was the interaction between the within-subject factors fbtype (unreliable/reliable) and 
time (test runs 1 to 4). This was tested by means of two-way RM-ANOVAs.  
Using a linear ANOVA contrast we tested the hypothesis that the linear 
performance change across time was different between the unreliable and reliable 
feedback conditions (henceforth referred to as linear interaction effect). In line with our 
hypothesis, we found a significant linear interaction effect between the factors feedback 
type (fbtype) and test run number (time) in experiment 1 (F(1, 29) = 7.93, p = .01;  
Figure 2.3a, p.32), but not in experiment 2 (F(1, 27) = 1.5, p = .23; Figure 2.3b, p.32). 
However, the session-wise slopes for performance were negative (i.e., decreased over 
time) in the unreliable feedback sessions of both the experiments (experiment  1: M =  
–3.05, SE = 0.66, t(33) = –4.64, p < .001; experiment 2: M = –1.67, SE = 0.74, t(31) = –2.24, 
p = .03), but the slope for the reliable feedback sessions did not deviate significantly from 
zero (experiment 1: M =  –0.05, SE = 0.54, t(33) = –0.09, p = .93; experiment 2: M = –0.33, 
SE = 0.71, t(31) = –0.46, p = .65). The between subject factors (tone-stimulus association 
type, sequence of sessions) and covariate (number of days between sessions) that were 
included in the ANOVA tests did not show significant interactions with fbtype and time 
(all p > .27). 
The pooled RM-ANOVA analysis performed to examine the common mechanisms 




subject factor) revealed a significant linear interaction effect between time and fbtype 
(F(1, 57) = 8.63, p = .005; Figure 2.3c, p.32), and like in the individual experiments, 
resulted from a decline in performance in the pooled dataset in unreliable feedback 
session (slope M= –2.38, SE = 0.5, t(65) = –4.78, p < .001), but not in the reliable feedback 
session (slope M = –0.18, SE = 0.44, t(65) = –0.42, p = .68). The three-way linear 
interaction between fbtype, time and experiment number was not significant (F(1, 57) = 
2.4, p = .13), indicating that the fbtype-by-time interaction was comparable across 
experiments.  
Thus, unreliable feedback interventions led to a decrease in task performance in 
the ensuing test runs even though reliable feedback was provided in these runs. 
 
Complementary analysis 
In order to understand if a similar drop in performance could be seen during the delivery 
of unreliable feedback as well, changes in the intervention runs were studied using linear 
ANOVA contrasts with fbtype and time (intervention runs 1 to 3) as the within-subject 
factors of interest, and the sequence of sessions and the number of days between sessions 
included as the between-subject factor and covariate, respectively. Similar to the test 
runs, the intervention runs too showed significant linear interaction between the factors 
fbtype and time (experiment 1: F(1, 31) = 7.67, p = .01; experiment 2:  F(1,29) = 4.82,  
p = .04, Figure 2.4a-b, solid circles and triangles, p.32), which was associated with a 
selective performance drop over time in the unreliable feedback session as evidenced by 
the significant negative slopes in these sessions (experiment 1: M = –1.81, SE = 0.79, t(33) 
= –2.29, p =.03; experiment 2: M = –1.62, SE = 0.7, t(31) = –2.33, p =.03), but not in the 
reliable feedback sessions (experiment 1: M = 0.77, SE = 0.56, t(33) = 1.37, p = .18; 
experiment 2: M = 1.37, SE = 0.8, t(31) = 1.72, p = .1). In both the experiments, three-way 
interactions between fbtype and time with the between-subject factor or covariate were 
not significant (all p > .23). In Figure 2.4 (p.32), performances in intervention runs (points 
2, 4, 6 on the X-axis) are displayed along with the performance in intervening test runs 







Figure 2.3: Performance in the test runs across time and feedback type in (a) experiment 1, (b) experiment 
2 and (c) across the pooled data (for illustrative purposes, data have been corrected for baseline  differences 
in performance between the two experiments). Errorbars show standard errors of the means. 
  
 
Figure 2.4: Performance in the intervention runs (filled triangles and circles) across time and feedback type 
in (a) experiment 1 and (b) experiment 2. Test runs are included for comparison (unfilled triangles and 




Thus, taken together, these results show that unreliable feedback systematically 
impairs the accuracy of perceptual decision-making, and that this effect was present even 
after the delivery of such feedback stopped. 
 
2.3.3.2. Unreliable feedback on perceptual decisions shifts responses towards prior 
beliefs 
In order to test our hypothesis that the behavioural responses shift towards prior beliefs, 
cue-congruence indices (CCI, equation 2.3, p.27) were compared across time (test runs 1 
to 4) and fbtype (unreliable/reliable) using the same analysis (two-way RM-ANOVA) that 
was used to study performance changes. Hence the critical analysis here too was the linear 
interaction between fbtype and time. This linear interaction effect did not reach the 
significance threshold in experiment 1 (F(1, 29) = 2.81, p = .1; Figure 2.5a, p.35), but it did 
so in experiment 2 (F(1, 27) = 4.51, p = .04; Figure 2.5b, p.35).  However, the session-wise 
slopes showed that in both the experiments, there was an increase in the CCI across time 
in the unreliable feedback session as seen by the significant positive slopes (experiment 1: 
slope M = 2.76, SE = 1.14, t(33) = 2.42, p = .02; experiment 2: slope M = 4.42, SE = 1.43, 
t(31) = 3.09, p = .004), but not in the reliable feedback sessions, as seen by the 
corresponding non-significant slopes (experiment 1: M = –0.41, SE = 1.04, t(31) = –0.4, 
p = .69; experiment 2: M = 0.63, SE = 1.39, t(31) = 0.45, p = .65). None of the between-
subject factors and covariates interacted significantly with fbtype and time (all p > 0.08).  
Similar to the pooled analysis that was performed for the performance data in the 
previous sub-section, we performed a post-hoc RM-ANOVA of the CCI data pooled across 
experiments 1 and 2 with the additional between-subject factor experiment number to 
study the common mechanisms underlying both experiments. This analysis revealed a 
significant linear interaction between fbtype and time (F(1,57) = 6.76, p = .01, Figure 2.5c, 
p.35), which was based on a positive slope for unreliable feedback (M = 3.57, SE = 0.91, 
t(65) = 3.93, p < .001) and a non-significant slope for reliable feedback (M = 0.09, SE = 
0.86, t(65) = 0.11, p = .91). Thus, unreliable feedback on perceptual choices increases the 







Since CCI is a difference, it is impossible to conclude whether the observed changes 
resulted from (1) enhancements in performance across time (test runs) in the cue-
congruent (CC) trials, (2) deteriorations in performance across time in the cue-
incongruent (CI) trials, or (3) a combination of (1) and (2). To clarify this, we performed 
RM-ANOVAs with the same within-subject factors, between-subject factors and between-
subject covariates as used in the analyses of overall performance and CCI. The analysis of 
congruent (CC) trials showed that the interaction between fbtype and time was not 
significant. Although there was a trend-wise interaction for the CC trials in experiment 1 
(F(1, 29) = 4.01, p = .055, see Figure 2.6a, p.35), this was likely due to the general decrease 
in the overall performance in the unreliable feedback session in experiment 1 (compare 
with Figure 2.3a, p.32). Further, there was no fbtype-by-time interaction for the CC trials 
in experiment 2 (F(1, 27) = 0.11, p = .74; Figure 2.6b, p.35). The interaction between 
fbtype and time was significant in the CI trials in both experiments (experiment 1:  
F(1, 29) = 7.87, p = .009; experiment 2:  F(1, 27) = 5.51, p = .03; Figure 2.6c-d, p.35), which 
corresponded to significant (one-sampled t-tests) negative slopes for the unreliable 
feedback sessions (experiment 1: M = –5.13, SE = 1.13, t = –4.51, p < .001;  experiment 2: 
M = –4.98, SE = 1.38, t = –3.6, p = .001) , and the absence of any significant slopes in the 
reliable feedback sessions (experiment 1: M = –0.27 , SE = 0.94,  t = 0.28, p = .78 ; 
experiment 2: M = –0.8, SE = 1.22, t = –0.66, p = .52). Thus, the increase in CCI observed as 
a result of unreliable feedback across runs is best explained by the second option, i.e., a 
greater deterioration in performance in the wrongly predicted (CI) trials. 
 
2.3.3.3. Unreliable feedback decreases confidence in responses during feedback 
delivery 
With the confidence ratings collected in experiment 2, we explored whether unreliable 
feedback would give rise to lower confidence in perceptual decisions. Confidence was 
encoded as a decimal value in the interval [0.03, 1], where 0.03 and 1 were the lowest and 
highest possible ratings of confidence, respectively (see Section 2.3.2.1 on p.26 and Figure 
2.2b on p.22). Similar to the earlier analyses, we first tested for a linear interaction 
between fbtype and time on the confidence ratings in the test runs. Contrary to the results 





Figure 2.5: Cue-congruence index (CCI) in the test runs across time and feedback type in (a) experiment 1, 




Figure 2.6 : Changes in accuracy in (a-b) congruent and (c-d) incongruent trials across time (test runs 1-4, 







subjective measure, i.e., confidence (F(1, 27) = 0.84, p = .37, Figure 2.7). Nevertheless, 
there was a small but highly significant increase in confidence across time in the reliable 
feedback sessions (slope M = 0.03, SE = 0.01, t(31) =3.12, p = .004), but not in the 
unreliable feedback sessions (slope M = –0.002, SE = 0.01, t(31) = –0.2, p = .84). 
Looking at the unreliable feedback sessions (Figure 2.7), there were sharp drops 
of confidence in the intervention runs of the unreliable feedback session (average 
confidence: M = 0.35, SE = 0.03), which relaxed to baseline in subsequent test runs (M = 
0.51, SE = 0.04). A comparison of the mean confidence in the test runs and the mean 
confidence in the intervention runs (both pooled across time) for the unreliable feedback 
session showed that the drop in confidence was highly significant (M = –0.16, SE = 0.02, 
t(31) = –6.67, p < .001). There was a slight decrease in mean confidence across the 
intervention runs compared to test runs even in the control sessions with reliable 
feedback as well – however, the decrease was much smaller here (M = –0.06, SE = 0.01, 
t(31) = –4.31, p < .001).  
Thus, while unreliable feedback has long-lasting effects on objective measures of 
perceptual inference (i.e., task performance and CCI) that transfer to test runs, it exerts a 




Figure 2.7: Mean confidence in the test runs (unfilled circles and triangles) and intervention runs (filled 






2.3.3.4. Other post-hoc tests 
Some additional tests were conducted to rule out the influence of non-perceptual factors 
such as awareness of feedback manipulation, motivation and initial position of the mouse 
cursor. These tests are described below: 
 
(i) Awareness of feedback manipulation  
Participants indicated their awareness of feedback manipulation during debriefing at the 
end of the second session of both the experiments (see Sections 2.3.1.9., p.25 and 2.3.2.4., 
p.28-29). Only a small fraction of participants (experiment 1: 23.53%, experiment 2: 
9.38%) were completely unaware of the feedback manipulation (score 0). Larger 
percentages of participants were partly (score 0.5, experiment 1: 32.35%, experiment 2: 
43.75%) or fully (score 1, experiment 1: 44.12%, experiment 2: 46.88%) aware of the 
manipulation.  
To investigate the relationship between the awareness scores and the main results 
(i.e., the decrease in performance and the increase in cue-congruence), we performed 
correlations (Figure 2.8, p.38) between the awareness scores 0, 0.5 and 1, and the slope 
differences for performance (δPerf. slope) and cue-congruence (δCCI slope) using Spearman’s 
rank correlation for both performance (experiment 1: r = .37, p =.03; experiment 2: r = 
.03, p = .89; Figure 2.8a-b) and CCI (experiment 1: r = –.35, p = .04; experiment 2:  r = –.18, 
p = .31; Figure 2.8c-d).  
Thus the results showed that the magnitudes of the performance and cue-
congruence effects decreased (i.e., got closer to zero) as the awareness of feedback 
manipulation increased in experiment 1, but there was no relationship between the 
effects and awareness in experiment 2. Critically, in experiment 1, the effects did not 
amplify with increasing awareness of feedback manipulation – if anything, awareness 
diminished our effects. Thus, the observed changes in performance and cue-congruence 





Figure 2.8: Relationships between the awareness of feedback manipulation (X-axes) and the slope 
differences for performance (δPerf. slope, a-b) and cue-congruence (δCCI slope, c-d) for experiments 1(a, c) and 2 
(b, d). In all plots, the triangles represent individual participants, and the black lines connect the mean slope 
differences at each level of awareness.  
 
(ii) Changes in motivation (experiment 2 only) 
A second post-hoc analysis investigated the influence of motivation on performance and 
cue-congruence. This analysis was performed only for experiment 2, where motivation 
ratings were collected for each run (Figure 2.9, p.39). Comparison of session-wise slopes  
between sessions revealed that there was no difference between motivation ratings on 
the unreliable and reliable feedback sessions (M = –0.5, SE = 1.28, t(31) = 0.39, p = .7, 
paired t-test). Next, we tested for correlations between slope differences of motivation 
ratings (δMotiv. slope) and analogous slope differences of the main dependent variables  
(δPerf. slope and δCCI slope). This correlation was not significant, both for performance (r = .05, 
p = .79, Figure 2.9a) and for CCI (r = –.12, p = .52, Figure 2.9b). Thus it appears that there 





Figure 2.9: The slope difference for motivation (δMotiv. slope, X-axis) plotted against the slope differences for 
(a) task performance (δPerf. slope) and (b) cue-congruence (δCCI slope) for experiment 2. In both plots, the 
triangles correspond to individual participants, and the black lines represent the linear fit of the data points. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: The influence of initial cursor position on the responses in experiment 2. Z-transformed 





(iii) Initial position of the cursor (experiment 2 only) 
In the third post-hoc test, we investigated whether the initial random position of the 
cursor had any influence on participants’ responses in experiment 2. There was no 
correlation overall between the initial cursor position and responses, as seen from the 
one-sample t-test of the Z-transformed subject-wise correlation coefficients (M = 0.02, SE 
= 0.01, t(31) = 1.47, p = .15). Further, such correlations also did not emerge during the 
experiment, as seen from the absence of linear interaction between time and fbtype  
(F(1, 27) = 0.38, p = .54, Figure 2.10, p.39) and main effect of time (F(1, 27) = 0.95, p = .34). 
Thus, the randomisation of the initial cursor position did not bias participants’ responses. 
 
2.4. Simulation 
Simulations were performed to forward-model the effects of unreliable and reliable 
feedback and to test our hypotheses in silico using artificial subjects. This served two 
purposes: (i) it allowed us to test our hypotheses on a much larger sample than is 
practically possible in the lab, and (ii) it allowed us to understand possible underlying 
mechanisms of unreliable feedback on learning and decision-making. The details of the 
simulation and implementation with artificial subjects are given below. 
 
2.4.1. Procedure 
The sensory data were modeled in the form of normal distributions with variance 4 and a 
mean value of either 0 (N0, “target absent”) or 0.5 (N1, “target present”). Variance and 
mean values were chosen such that they matched the target performance of the staircase 
procedure in the behavioural experiment (approximately 80% correct).  
Training of the observer’s sensory classifier was based on two normal-gamma 
distributions (D0 and D1) that were used to learn mean value and variance of the two 
classes represented by the distributions N0 and N1. A normal-gamma distribution is a 
four-parameter distribution, which represents a probabilistic estimate of the moments of 
a normal distribution and is updated with new samples from this normal distribution (i.e., 
it is a conjugate prior for normal distributions with unknown mean and variance in 




observations (infinite samples from the true underlying normal distribution), the normal-
gamma distribution would represent a certain estimate of the underlying normal 
distribution, and the posterior predictive distribution would then converge to the true 
distribution. The training procedure is shown schematically in Figure 2.11a. 
  
Figure 2.11: Details of the simulation. (a) Training of the sensory classifier in the simulation (training and 
intervention runs). Two normal-gamma distributions (D0 and D1) were fed with samples (histograms) 
from two normal distributions ‘0’ (“target absent”) and ‘1’ (“target present”). (b) Decision-making in the 
simulation (test runs).  A vote of the sensory classifier about the presence of absence of target (sensvote) 
was obtained by comparing the likelihoods of the sensory data between D0 and D1. This vote was combined 
with cue information (cuevote) in a logistic function to make decisions (equations 2.4-2.6). 
 
The likelihood that the new samples belong to one of the stimulus classes 
represented in the respective normal-gamma (D0 or D1) can be evaluated with the 
respective posterior predictive distributions (obtained by integrating over the normal-
gamma distribution), each of which took the form of a student t-distribution. Hence, the 
likelihood of the data, given the predictive distribution of the normal-gamma, is a measure 




represented by the respective normal-gamma distribution. Here, the observer collected 
40 samples from the normal distribution in each trial. Next, the vote of the sensory 
classifier (called sensvote here) was obtained by subtracting the log likelihood of the data 
given hypothesis 0 (samples are drawn from the normal distribution N0 represented in 
D0) from the log likelihood of the data given hypothesis 1 (samples are drawn from the 
normal distribution N1 represented in D1). Mathematically, this can be represented as 
follows: 
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑝(𝑋|𝐷1)) − 𝑙𝑛 (𝑝(𝑋|𝐷0))                            (2.4) 
The sensory vote thus obtained is a measure of how much more likely the sensory data 
originates from the “target present” distribution N1 as compared to the “target absent” 
distribution N0. Thus, sensvote is a single value obtained for each trial, without an 
associated distribution or precision. Similarly, a trialwise cuevote was obtained as binary 
values 0 or 1, encoding “target absent” and “target present”, respectively. To identify their 
individual contributions to the actual stimulus (i.e., target absent/present), the regression 
coefficients corresponding to sensvote and cuevote (βs and βc, respectively) were 
obtained by fitting these terms to the actual stimulus category using logistic regression. 
This is because at this stage, the simulated observer learns from reliable feedback 
providing information about true stimulus categories, analogous to learning from reliable 
feedback in the test runs of the behavioural experiments. The estimated regression 
coefficients are in theory comparable to precisions (or inverse variances) of distributions 
corresponding to different sources of information.  Next, to estimate the behavioural 
outcome, the decision classifier took the form of a logistic regression with sensvote and 
cuevote as predictors, and then converted the predictions to binary decisions as shown 
below in equations 2.5-2.6: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 +
1
1+exp(𝑐+𝛽𝑠∗𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒+ 𝛽𝑐∗𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
             (2.5) 
 
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 < 0.5 





Predictions below and above 0.5 were assigned to the categories “target absent” and 
“target present”, respectively. The constant c in equation 2.5 was estimated using 
maximum likelihood optimisation (implemented in the fitglm routine of the Matlab 
Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox) and was included to improve the flexibility of 
the model in case of unequal apriori probabilities of stimuli. The decision-making 
procedure is shown schematically in Figure 2.11b (p.41). The simulation used functions 
from the Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox of MATLAB. 
 
2.4.2. Implementation 
To mimic the above-chance performance of human observers at baseline, the sensory 
classifiers (distributions D0 and D1) were pre-trained with 20 samples of “stimuli” (N0 
and N1). This was followed by simulations of test and intervention runs alternating in a 
manner similar to the behavioural experiments (Figure 2.1c, p.20). In the test runs, stimuli 
were classified by the decision classifier based on sensory data and the cue information 
as described above. As the goal of the simulation was specifically to investigate the effect 
of learning from unreliable feedback, the sensory classifiers were not updated in the test 
runs, i.e., there was no learning in the simulated test runs. In the intervention runs, the 
sensory classifiers (distributions D0 and D1) were updated with samples from 
distributions N0 and N1. If the feedback was reliable, distribution D0 was always updated 
with samples from N0 and D1 with samples from N1. However, if the feedback was 
unreliable, each distribution (D0 and D1) was trained with N0 in one half of the trials and 
N1 in the other half, i.e., half of the virtual stimuli were mislabelled (analogous to invalid 
feedback trials in the behavioural experiments). The number of virtual trials, or updates, 
were identical to those of the behavioural experiments – 64 trials in the simulated test 
runs and 128 trials in the simulated intervention runs. 
The main hypotheses about the effects of unreliable feedback (relative to reliable 
feedback) on task performance and cue-congruence were tested using the simulated data. 
1000 iterations were performed each of unreliable and reliable feedback interventions. 
These were taken to be 1000 artificial “subjects” in data analysis. Based on the predicted 
responses, performance and CCI were computed for each test run (see Section 2.3.2.2., 
p.27), and the effect of unreliable feedback was computed using a two-way RM-ANOVA 




factors. Significant interactions were further explored using session-wise slopes, 
computed for each artificial subject by linearly fitting run-wise performance and CCI data 
across time (test runs) separately for unreliable and reliable feedback. 
 
2.4.3. Results 
The simulated data was tested in the same manner as the data from the behavioural 
experiments, i.e., using two-way RM-ANOVAs with time (test run number) and fbtype 
(unreliable/reliable) as factors. We note that the simulation-based values for 
performance and CCI cannot be interpreted in absolute terms as these depend on 
arbitrary simulation parameters representing the initial moments of the two stimulus 
distributions. Thus, only changes in performance and CCI can be inferred from the 
simulations. 
 
2.4.3.1. Unreliable feedback impairs task performance in the simulated 
participants 
The linear interaction between fbtype (reliable/ unreliable) and time (test runs 1 to 4) 
was significant (F(1, 999) = 92.42, p < .001) for the simulated data, in line with our 
hypothesis (Figure 2.12a, p.45). Post-hoc analyses showed that the observed interaction 
was based on a decrease in performance, indicated by the significantly negative slope 
across time in the unreliable feedback session (M = –0.8, SE = 0.07, t(999) = –12.32,  p < 
.001) and a non-significant slope across time in the reliable feedback session (M = 0.01, 
SE = 0.06, t(999) = 0.14, p = .89).  Thus, the simulation further verified our hypothesis that 
unreliable feedback impairs performance in perceptual decision making. 
 
2.4.3.2. Unreliable feedback enhances cue-congruent responses in the simulated 
participants 
In line with our hypothesis and the behavioural data, the simulation showed a significant 
linear interaction effect for CCI (F(1,999) = 166.7, p < .001; Figure 2.12b, p.45). Further in 





Figure 2.12: Results from the simulated data. (a) Task performance, (b) Cue-congruence index (CCI),  
(c) performance in congruent trials (CC) and (d) performance in incongruent trials (CI) across fbtype and 
time for the simulated data. Note that the Y-axis values are vastly different across (a), (c) and (d). Errorbars 
show standard errors of the means. 
 
session, resulting in a positive slope (M = 4.41, SE = 0.29, t(999) = 15.06, p  < .001), and 
did not change in the reliable feedback session, showing no change in slope (M = –0.08, SE 
= 0.2, t(999) = –0.39, p = .69). 
Next, to understand the changes in performance in the CC and CI trials, we 
computed run-wise performances separately for CC and CI trials, and analysed changes 
across time and fbtype using two RM-ANOVAs. The analysis revealed that there was a 
significant interaction between fbtype and time in the CC trials (F(1, 999) = 36.83, p < 




time as indicated by the positive slope in the unreliable (M = 0.3, SE = 0.04, t(999) = 7.59, 
p < .001) and not the reliable  (M = –0.01, SE = 0.03, t(999) = –0.34, p = .73) feedback 
session. Similarly, a significant interaction was also observed for the CI trials (F(1, 999) = 
156.75, p < .001, Figure 2.12d, p.45), which was shown to result from a decrease in 
performance across time as indicated by the negative slope in the unreliable feedback 
group (M = –4.11, SE = 0.28, t(999) = –14.84, p < .001) but not in the reliable feedback 
group (M = 0.07, SE = 0.2, t(999) = 0.34, p = .74). Thus, the simulations confirm that 
unreliable feedback would result in an increase in CCI, contributed both by improved task 




This study investigated the influence of unreliable feedback on perceptual inference using 
two behavioural experiments and a simulation. We observed that when unreliable 
feedback was provided to perceptual decisions, (1) task performance deteriorated, and 
(2) perceptual inference was shifted towards learned priors in the following period.  
Previous studies have already shown trends in the direction of our observations – 
that unreliable feedback prevents learning (Herzog & Fahle, 1997, 1999), changes the 
sensitivity to stimuli (Aberg & Herzog, 2012) and that it induces false percepts even after 
delivery of such feedback stops (Vannucci et al., 2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
Further, studies have also shown that a decrease in the precision of likelihood 
distributions can shift the inference towards priors (Körding & Wolpert, 2004). Since the 
prior (defined by a fixed cue-stimulus association) in our experiments did not interact 
with unreliable feedback across the course of the experiment, the observed increase in 
cue-congruent responses was likely due to the decline in accuracy in the processing of 
sensory information. Please note that if unreliable feedback would have been presented 
in the presence of predictive cues or priors, the precisions of both the priors and the 
sensory evidence would likely have been affected, which may have reduced or even 
nullified the observed prior-congruent behaviour. Here, in order to delineate the 
influence of unreliable feedback on the processing of the bottom-up sensory evidence and 
to prevent a direct learning between cues and unreliable feedback, we kept the prior 




perception, where priors are learnt over the course of life and are hence unlikely to 
change due to temporary uncertainty. 
 The decrease in performance was stronger in experiment 1 than in experiment 2, 
the latter experiment resulting in a negative performance slope for the unreliable 
feedback session, but no significant linear interaction between fbtype and time. This 
difference between the two experiments could be due to several reasons. One possibility 
is that the baseline performance (test run 1) was higher in experiment 2 than experiment 
1, thereby reducing task difficulty and consequently the disruptive influence of unreliable 
feedback. The task could have also been less perceptually demanding, since more time 
was given to make responses on the continuous scale in experiment 2. Finally, the effect 
of unreliable feedback may simply differ between detection and discrimination tasks. 
Different neural mechanisms have been proposed to underlie detection and 
discrimination, both in terms of the neurons encoding visual stimuli at lower levels (Hol 
& Treue, 2001) and in the cognitive resources required to perform the tasks (Sagi & Julesz, 
1984). Discrimination has been suggested to be more demanding and to involve two 
subsets of neurons instead of one. However, since we see the opposite effect in our results, 
this is an unlikely explanation for the differences seen between the two behavioural 
experiments. 
Conceivably, non-perceptual mechanisms may have led to the observed increase 
in prior congruence. For instance, following the cue could have been a conscious strategy 
adopted by participants. However in such cases, the accuracy in congruent (CC) trials 
would have drastically increased, and the performance in CI trials would have reduced 
drastically, approaching 100% and 0%, respectively. However, from Figure 2.6 (p.35), we 
can see that in the unreliable feedback sessions, (1) performance in CC trials does not 
increase and (2) that the decrease in performance in CI trials is of a smaller magnitude. 
This pattern of results suggests a slow and rather automatic shift in responses towards 
the prior. 
 We also performed post-hoc tests to identify potential confounds in our results due 
to participants’ awareness of the feedback manipulation, subjective motivation or the 
initial position of the cursor (when a continuous response scale was used). Results 
revealed that the effects (δPerf. slope and δCCI slope) did not increase with a higher awareness 




manipulation reduced the differences between sessions and thereby the efficacy of 
feedback manipulation. Changes in motivation did not correlate with changes in 
performance and cue-congruence either. Lastly, in experiment 2, the initial position of the 
cursor on the response bar did not influence the responses. These results attest that the 
performance and cue-congruence effects did not arise from deliberate strategies or 
differences in subjective motivation. However, we acknowledge that participants’ 
awareness of unreliable feedback could have reduced the sizes of our effects. 
 Since confidence is an indicator of performance in addition to metacognition 
(Guggenmos et al., 2016; Hebart et al., 2016; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) , it is possible 
to suggest that in experiment 2, confidence simply mirrors performance. However, it must 
be noted that although the relative differences between sessions (unreliable vs. reliable) 
were similar between performance and confidence, the actual events are slightly 
different: unreliable feedback prevents an increase of confidence whereas it decreases 
performance accuracy. The influence of unreliable feedback on performance and 
confidence should be tested in a future experiment where reliable feedback is not 
delivered in the test runs, which might help to counteract the immediate restoration of 
performance and confidence. 
 Taken together, the simulations and the experiments detailed in this chapter 
suggest that unreliable feedback, when given to perceptual choices, has a debilitating 
effect on performance and skews perception towards prior beliefs.  While this study could 
not determine whether these effects stemmed from changes in sensory processing in the 
visual cortex or due to changes in higher-level decision-making processes (Herzog & 
Fahle, 1999; Rahnev, Nee, Riddle, Larson, & D’Esposito, 2016), Study II, described in the 
next chapter, used neuroimaging to investigate the neural processes underlying the 
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3.1.  Introduction 
As detailed in the preceding chapters, perception is an inferential process, whereby an 
internal model of the world is used to infer the most probable causes of the sensory data 
(Friston, 2005; O’Reilly et al., 2012). For such perceptual inference to be adaptive, the 
reliability of the sources of sensory data must be taken into account: Highly reliable 
sensory information should be given more weight in perceptual inference than unreliable 
information (Adams et al., 2013; Knill & Pouget, 2004). Typically, reliability of the sensory 
information is manipulated in experiments by adding varying levels of noise to stimuli, 
and it has been shown that this results in neural stimulus representations in sensory areas 
that are less informative (Darcy et al., 2019; Hebart et al., 2012; Ludwig et al., 2016). We 
hypothesised that neural representations may not only be affected by the currently 
available sensory information, but also by learned beliefs regarding its reliability. To test 
this, we designed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment in which 
sensory stimulation in a challenging visual discrimination task was kept constant, while a 
belief about the uncertainty of sensory information was induced by giving unreliable 
feedback on task performance. We predicted that this manipulation would lead to a 
deterioration of neural stimulus representations. 
Previous studies have shown that the delivery of unreliable feedback in visual and 
auditory tasks impaired performance and prevented perceptual learning (Herzog & Fahle, 
1997, 1999; Vuvan et al., 2018). Further, participants had a higher tendency to see 
patterns in noise (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) and at lower signal-to-noise ratios 
(Vannucci et al., 2011). Noisy feedback was also shown to shown to shift responses away 
from sensory information and towards prior knowledge in a visuo-motor task (Körding & 
Wolpert, 2004). These previous reports strongly suggest that sensory information gets 
down-weighed under conditions of environmental uncertainty; however the neural 
changes underlying such behaviour has not been studied yet. 
 Based on previous fMRI studies showing successful decoding of visual grating 
orientations from activation patterns in primary visual cortex (V1) (Kamitani & Tong, 
2005; Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kok et al., 2012), we employed an orientation discrimination 
task and examined changes in V1 using pattern distinctness (Allefeld & Haynes, 2014), an 
index that estimates the dissimilarity between multivariate activity patterns of competing 




task whose difficulty was determined by the deviation of each stimulus from a reference 
orientation in a clockwise (CW) or counter-clockwise (CCW) direction. There were two 
such reference orientations (45° and 135°) and correspondingly two pairs of stimuli 
(Figure 3.1, p.53). In order to rule out the role of motor preparation during stimulus 
presentation, the stimulus-response mapping was also randomised. Thus, participants 
were informed of which response buttons to use to indicate their percepts only after the 
stimuli disappeared (Hebart et al., 2012; Kahnt, Grueschow, Speck, & Haynes, 2011). 
 Critically, the stimulus orientations were determined for each participant prior to 
the main experiment based on their individual performance thresholds, and thus the 
bottom-up sensory information remained the same all through the main experiment. 
Similar to Study I, beliefs about uncertainty were induced by providing unreliable 
feedback on performance in a dedicated intervention phase, and the effects of such 
interventions on sensory representations of stimuli were measured by neural activity 
patterns in the test phases that precedes and followed the intervention phase. To 
minimise learning during the test phases, feedback was withheld in these runs. To control 
for some of the general effects of the task such as stimulus exposure, motivation, attention, 
fatigue etc., a separate group of age- and gender-matched participants performed the 
same experiment, but with reliable feedback in the intervention phase instead of 
unreliable feedback. A between-subject design was adopted to maximise uncertainty and 
to reduce the possibility of participants detecting external feedback manipulation. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis 
In this study, we hypothesised that relative to reliable feedback, unreliable feedback 
would lead to (1) a decrease in task performance accuracy in a visual orientation 
discrimination task and (2) a decrease in the distinctness of multivariate patterns 





3.3. Materials and methods 
3.3.1.  General design 
Each participant took part in one experimental session, where they were first trained in 
the task outside the fMRI scanner, following which they were taken to the scanner, where 
a threshold estimation was performed first (when brain images were not acquired), 
followed by the main experiment (where functional images were acquired during the 
task). In the main experiment, stimuli were presented at the orientations determined in 
the preceding threshold estimation step. The main experiment consisted of a pre-
intervention test phase without feedback, an intervention phase with either unreliable or 
reliable feedback and a post-intervention test phase without feedback (Figure 3.1a, p.53). 
Thus, the study had a between-subject design, where participants were assigned to one of 
two experimental groups that differed only with respect to the feedback delivery in the 
intervention phase – one group received trial-wise feedback on task performance that 
was valid at chance-level (in 50% of the trials), whereas the other group received trial-
wise performance feedback that was always valid (in 100% of the trials). 
 
3.3.2. Participants 
The study was approved by the ethics committee at Charité - Universitätsmedizin 
Berlin, and informed consents were collected from all participants.  Participants were 
students from Humboldt University and Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin. Thirty-two 
healthy participants took part in the experiment (ages 18-35, mean age = 24.9, 13 female). 
Of these, two participants were excluded from the experiment before the intervention 
phase due to chance-level performance in several runs in the pre-intervention phase. This 
left us with 30 participants – with 15 participants each in the unreliable and reliable 
feedback groups. FMRI data from a participant in the reliable feedback group had to be 
discarded due to excessive head motion during the post-intervention phase. Further, the 
fMRI data from two (out of eight) runs in the post-intervention phase of eight participants 
(N=4 from each group) were lost due to an error in the scanner sequence. In these 
participants, the corresponding two runs from the pre-intervention runs were likewise 
excluded for fMRI data analysis to make the pre- and post-intervention data comparable 







Figure 3.1.  (a) Time course of the main experiment (i.e., after threshold estimation). (b) Sinusoidal grating 
stimuli used for the orientation discrimination task. There were two pairs of stimuli corresponding to the 
implicit diagonals at 135° and 45°. Reference lines are shown in red here for illustrative purposes, they were 
not presented during the actual experiment. The depicted orientation deviations from diagonals are also 
exaggerated for illustration.  (c) On each trial, one of two types of response mapping was assigned randomly: 
CCW (CW) responses were to be indicated by pressing either the left (right) button or the right (left) button 
of a response box. Time courses of trials in (d) test runs and (e) intervention runs. The response cues are 
enlarged in (d) and (e) for better visibility. ISI = inter-stimulus interval, RW = response window. 
  
3.3.3. Stimuli  
Stimulus presentation was implemented using PsychToolbox 3.0.11 (psychtoolbox.org) 
for Matlab (MathWorks Inc.). Visual stimuli were presented on a monitor (resolution: 
1024 x 768 pixels) and projected using an oblique mirror into the eyes of participants 
lying in a supine position (total distance 154 cm). The stimuli were high-contrast annular 
sinusoidal gratings (inner radius = 1.32°, outer radius = 6.69°, spatial frequency = 
1.29cpd) with luminance ranging from 25% to 75% of the maximum luminance of the 




stimuli against the grey background, these edges were blurred using circular Gaussian 
functions centred at the inner (1.38°) and outer (6.64°) edges such that the contrast 
gradually fades until it matches the grayscale background (standard deviation σ = 0.44°). 
This procedure rendered high contrast sinusoidal gratings with soft edges (see Figure 
3.1b, p.53). Image properties such as contrast, spatial frequency and size were not 
changed between various orientations and across the whole experiment. To reduce neural 
adaptation and to avoid “point-of-reference” strategies by the participants, the Gabor 
patches were presented with variable phase shifts in different trials, randomly drawn 
from 16 equally spaced shifts between 0 and 2π.  
On each trial, one of four stimuli could be presented (Figure 3.1b, p.53) – i.e., 
stimuli rotated clockwise (CW) or counter-clockwise (CCW) relative to the two reference 
orientations, i.e., 45° or 135°. In the training phase (described in Section 3.3.7.1, p.56), 
participants learnt to use the relevant diagonal for each type of stimulus. The diagonal to 
be compared against was the one which was in the same quadrant as the presented 
stimulus (for example, if the presented stimulus had an orientation of 60°, the correct 
percept would be that it was clockwise, since the 45° diagonal was the correct reference 
to use). The degree of deviation from the diagonal references was determined in the 
threshold estimation phase prior to the main experiment, so that the same four stimulus 
orientations were presented all through the main experiment.  
 
3.3.4. Responses 
In order to orthogonalise stimuli and responses and to prevent motor planning during 
stimulus presentation, participants were informed of the stimulus-response mapping (i.e., 
which button to press to indicate the perception of the CCW and CW orientations) only 
after the stimulus disappeared (Hebart et al., 2012; Kahnt et al., 2011). All possible 
sequences of the response cues that were presented are illustrated in Figure 3.1c (p.53). 
Response cues were presented for a time window of 1s, during which participants were 
asked to make responses (Figure 3.1d-e, p.53). The cues were small circles with arrows 
indicating the response mapping (CCW/ CW) and were presented on the left and right 
sides of the fixation dot with their inner arcs at 0.48° visual angle. There were two pairs 
of response cues corresponding to stimuli with 45° and 135° references, and these could 




themselves with the response cues and how to use them during the initial training outside 
the scanner. 
 
3.3.5.  Feedback 
Trial-by-trial feedback was delivered by means of auditory tones after each response 
during training, threshold estimation and in the intervention phase of the main 
experiment (see Section 3.3.7., p.56-57). The tones were positive, negative or neutral, 
depending on whether the response was correct, incorrect or missed, respectively. 
Participants in the unreliable feedback group received pseudo-randomised feedback in 
the intervention runs, such that in half of the trials, the feedback delivered was faulty (i.e., 
positive tones after incorrect button presses and negative tones after correct button 
presses). Participants in the reliable feedback group always received valid feedback. 
Similar to the stimuli and response cues, participants also familiarised themselves with 
the feedback tones and their associated meanings during the initial training period. 
 
3.3.6. Trials 
The time course of test and intervention trials are shown in Figure 3.1d-e (p.53). On each 
trial, participants’ task was to report their perceived orientation of the grating as either 
CCW or CW with respect to an implicit diagonal reference (see Figure 3.1b on p.53 and 
Section 3.3.3. on p.53-54). Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation dot (radius 
0.1° visual angle) for 2±1s, followed by the presentation of the visual stimulus for 0.2s, 
which was followed by fixation for 2±1s. Next, the response window was presented for 
1s, during which the response mapping was indicated using the response cues, and 
responses were made by pressing one of two buttons on an fMRI-compatible button box. 
In the intervention phase alone, following the response, there was another fixation 
window (2±1s), following which the auditory feedback was delivered (0.75s). On each 
trial, the durations of the fixation windows (ISI, response and feedback) were sampled 
randomly from a distribution consisting of 8 evenly spaced values between 1 and 3 





3.3.7. Experimental schedule 
At the beginning of the experiment and outside of the scanner, participants were trained 
in the orientation discrimination task using supra-threshold versions of the gratings (20 
minutes). Once inside the scanner, individual orientation discrimination thresholds for 
the main experiment were determined using a staircase procedure (10 minutes). 100% 
valid feedback was delivered both in the training and the threshold estimation steps to 
facilitate learning of the task and the response mapping. The main experiment consisted 
of 24 runs (overall 85 minutes), and this was followed by a short functional localiser task 
(6 minutes). At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and compensated. 
 
3.3.7.1. Training 
Participants performed training runs in a testing room outside the scanner. The first run 
consisted of supra-threshold stimuli and the participants manually navigated through 
each stimulus and response screen at their own pace. The second run consisted likewise 
of supra-threshold stimuli, but trial timings corresponded to those of the main experiment 
(time course shown in Figure 3.1e, p.53). If necessary, the second run was repeated until 
the participant could make responses in the given time and got at least 80% correct 
responses. 
 
3.3.7.2. Staircase procedure 
Inside the scanner, participants performed a staircase task to set the threshold deviation 
of stimuli from the diagonal references at which they could discriminate between CCW 
and CW orientations with moderate difficulty. To this end, we used a two-down, one-up 
staircases with equal step-sizes up and down which arrived at an 80% performance 
threshold. The first phase of the staircase procedure determined the approximate signal 
threshold and had larger step-sizes (angular deviations from the two diagonals were 
multiplied by the factors 10–0.03 and 100.03 to decrease or increase thresholds, 
respectively). The second phase started at the threshold estimated by the first staircase 
and used a fixed step size of 0.3°, both for an increase and for a decrease in deviations 




reversals for phase one, ten reversals for phase two) were reached or 80 trials were 
completed. Thresholds were estimated by averaging the last four and six reversal points 
for the staircase phases one and two, respectively. On average, this procedure resulted in 
comparable threshold deviations across the two participant groups (unreliable: M = 7.85°, 
SE = 1.53°, reliable: M = 8.08°, SE = 0.89°; two-tailed, two-sample t-test: t(28) = 0.13,  
p = .9). 
 
3.3.7.3. Main experiment 
The main experiment consisted of 24 runs, split into three parts (Figure 3.1a, p.53): Runs 
1-8 were pre-intervention test runs (without feedback), runs 9-16 were intervention runs 
(with feedback) and runs 17-24 were post-intervention test runs (without feedback). 
Each run consisted of 32 trials, in which each of the four types of stimuli (threshold 
CCW/CW deviations from the 45° and 135° diagonal references) were shown 8 times. In 
the intervention runs, half of the participants received reliable feedback, and the other 
half received unreliable feedback. The pre- and post-intervention test runs were identical 
in structure, and their purpose was to measure changes induced during the intervention 
phases with reliable/unreliable feedback. 
 
3.3.7.4. Functional localiser 
A functional localiser run was included after the main experiment, in which the four 
stimulus conditions of the main experiment were presented, along together with a fifth 
fixation-only baseline condition. Each condition was shown in a block of 12-second 
duration, and the conditions were repeated six times in a pseudo-random order. During 
the 12-second presentations of the four stimuli, the 16 phase shifted visual stimuli 
(mentioned in sub-section Stimuli, Section 3.3.3., p.53-54) were presented randomly at a 
rate of 3.33Hz. To ensure that participants fixated during the functional localiser run, a 
central fixation dot was present in all conditions and changed its colour to red briefly 
(0.3s) at random, and participants were asked to press the left response button to indicate 






At the end of the experiment, all participants were given questionnaires to probe their 
awareness of having received unreliable feedback and motivation to do the task. 
Participants also rated their motivation to do the task in each phase of the experiment as 
a percentage value. The relevant questions are given below (verbatim): 
(i) How reliable(correct) was the feedback (0 = absolutely not reliable(correct),100 = 
totally reliable(correct)) 
         0%------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100% 
(ii) During the experiment, did you think that the feedback was manipulated? Please circle 
your response 
        Definitely yes/ highly likely / maybe / highly unlikely/ definitely not 
(iii)  Did your trust in the feedback change at any point during the experiment?  If so, please 
mention at what point approximately that occurred. 
(iv)  On a scale of 0(absolutely not motivated) to 100(fully motivated), how motivated where 
you during  
(a) Run 1: Blocks 1 to 8, no feedback 
(b) Run 2: Blocks 1 to 8, with feedback 
(c) Run 3: Blocks 1 to 8, no feedback 
(d) Run 4: 1 block, colour change detection task 
 
Please note that in this context, “run” and “block” allude to what we refer to in the rest of 
the chapter as a “phase” and “run”, respectively.  
 
3.3.8. Eye-tracking 
To ensure fixation, an MRI-compatible video-based eye-tracker (iView XTM MRI 50Hz, 
SensoMotoric Instruments, Teltow, Germany) was used to monitor participants’ gaze 
position throughout the experiment. Eye-tracking data could not be collected from two 
participants due to difficulties in calibration or in the detection of pupil and corneal reflex 
by the camera. In all other participants, partial or full data were collected and pre-




interpolation of missing data points when there was fewer than eight missing data points 
(160ms), (3) removal of linear trends and (4) computation of running averages across five 
consecutive points (100ms). After pre-processing, data corresponding to the stimulus 
presentation windows (200ms) were extracted. Next, participants with a high proportion 
of missing data  (defined as (i) more than 70% invalid data points overall or within the 
stimulus presentation windows of the pre- or the post-intervention phases, or (ii) no data 
at all from more than six out of the eight runs present within each pre- or the post-
intervention phase).  The area inside the inner edge of the stimuli was selected as the 
fixation window (radius 1.32°), and fixation performance was quantified for each test 
phase as the percentage of data points that were within this fixation window during 
stimulus presentation. Overall, valid data was retrieved successfully from 22 participants 
(12 from the unreliable feedback group and 10 from the reliable feedback group). 
 
3.3.9. FMRI data acquisition and processing  
3.3.9.1. Data acquisition 
Functional brain images were acquired at a 3T Siemens Trio (Erlangen, Germany) scanner 
using a gradient echo-planar imaging sequence and a 12-channel head coil. Each run in 
the pre- and post-intervention phases consisted of 90 T2*-weighted whole-brain volumes 
each, and the functional localiser consisted of 180 whole-brain volumes. Other 
parameters remained the same during the main experiment and the localiser (TR = 2s, TE 
= 30ms, flip angle = 78°, 33 slices, descending acquisition, 3mm isotropic resolution, 
0.7mm gap between slices). In addition, high-resolution structural T1-weighted images 
were acquired using the MPRAGE sequence (TR = 1.9s, TE = 2.52ms, flip angle = 9°, 192 
slices, 1mm isotropic resolution).  
 
3.3.9.2. FMRI data processing 
The functional images were corrected for slice acquisition delays and 
translational/rotational motion using the MATLAB-based Statistical Parametric Mapping 
Toolbox (SPM12, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Next, the functional images in their native 




Colin27 (which had been inverse-normalised to the native subject-space) to correct for a 
misalignment between them – this was important for later anatomical voxel selection 
(since the anatomical mask was in alignment with the Colin27 mask). After this step, the 
functional images were smoothed with a 3mm (FWHM) Gaussian kernel, since recent 
studies support spatial smoothing in multivariate analysis (Gardumi et al., 2016; 
Hendriks, Daniels, Pegado, & Op de Beeck, 2017; Misaki, Luh, & Bandettini, 2013; Op de 
Beeck, 2010). Next, three general linear models (GLMs) were defined for each participant 
corresponding to the pre-intervention runs, the post-intervention runs and the functional 
localiser runs. In each GLM, the four stimuli (Figure 3.1b, p.53) were included as separate 
regressors, and a fifth regressor encoded the response windows with button presses. 
These regressors were then convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response 
function as implemented in SPM12. In addition, the six translation and rotation 
parameters obtained from the motion correction step were included in each model as 
regressors of no interest. The GLMs from the pre- and post-intervention runs were used 
to estimate pattern distinctness (see below), and the GLM from the functional localiser 
was used to create a T-contrast map of voxels that responded to the visual field region in 
which the four visual stimuli were presented (Stimulus > Fixation), which was used for 
the selection of voxels for the estimation of pattern distinctness.  Thus, voxels within brain 
area V1 were selected if they (1) had a probability of greater than 50% of belonging to V1 
(area hOc1 in the SPM-based Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005)) and (2) were 
significant at an uncorrected T-contrast threshold of 0.05. Additionally, T-contrast maps 
(all stimuli > 0) were also computed for each test phase (pre-/ post-intervention) to later 
estimate mean activity within the V1 mask for a complementary analysis. 
 
Estimation of pattern distinctness: To estimate the distinctness of stimulus-evoked BOLD 
activation patterns in V1, we used the cross-validated (CV) MANOVA algorithm (Allefeld 
& Haynes, 2014). CV-MANOVA performs a leave-one-run-out cross-validation to compute 
an unbiased estimate of the distinctness of activation patterns. When used to compare 
two multivariate patterns, this measure of pattern distinctness is analogous to the 
Mahalanobis distance. In the current experiment, the pattern distinctness thus 
corresponded to the cross-validated Mahalanobis distance between stimulus pairs with 
the same diagonal reference (i.e., pair 1 consists of gratings deviating CW and CCW from 




reference, see Figure 3.1b, p.53). Higher values of pattern distinctness indicate more 
dissimilarity between competing stimuli, and correspondingly, better stimulus 
representations. By averaging across the pattern distinctness for the two stimulus pairs, 
we obtained a single estimate of pattern distinctness for each participant and test phase 
(pre-/post- intervention).  
 
3.4. Statistical analyses 
The key behavioural dependent variable was the orientation discrimination performance 
during the pre- and post-intervention test phases, which was quantified as the percentage 
of correct responses within each phase. The key dependent variable for the fMRI data 
analysis was the mean pattern distinctness obtained from each test phase as described in 
the previous section. 
2x2 mixed-design ANOVAs consisting of the between-subject factor feedback type 
(fbtype: unreliable or reliable) and the within-subject factor test phase (time: pre-/post-
intervention) were performed separately for the two dependent variables, namely, task 
performance and pattern distinctness. The orientation discrimination threshold was 
included as a covariate of no interest in both the analyses.  Our critical prediction was that 
there would be a significant interaction between the factors fbtype and time as a result of 
the relative decrease in performance and pattern distinctness in the unreliable feedback 
group. In case of significant interactions, post-hoc one-sample t-tests (two-tailed) were 
performed of the changes in performance (ΔPercent correct) and pattern distinctness  
(ΔPattern distinctness), computed as differences between post- and pre-intervention values. 
Thus, Δ<0, Δ=0 and Δ>0 would correspond to deteriorations, absence of changes and 
enhancements, respectively, in performance/ pattern distinctness. To determine the 
effect sizes of the behavioural and neural changes, Cohen’s d corrected for the small 
sample size (Durlak, 2009) was estimated separately for changes in performance and  
pattern distinctness between the two groups (unreliable/ reliable feedback).   
Since the pattern distinctness at each test phase was averaged between stimulus 
pairs that had a common diagonal (i.e., pair 1: CW/CCW deviations from the 45° diagonal 
and pair 2: CW/CCW deviations from the 135° diagonal, see Figure 3.1b, p.53), we 




separately for the reliable and unreliable feedback groups using paired t-tests to identify 
potential biases in our results. 
Next, to test if the changes in pattern distinctness induced by the delivery of 
unreliable feedback paralleled similar changes in performance, Pearson correlation was 
computed between the changes in performance (ΔPercent correct) and pattern distinctness 
(ΔPattern distinctness). In order to test for the robustness of this correlation, this correlation 
was additionally computed after the removal of outliers. Outliers were defined as the 
ΔPercent correct or ΔPattern distinctness data points that deviated from the first or third quartile of 
the dataset by more than 1.5 times of the inter-quartile range (IQR). This correlation 
analysis was performed only for the participant group that received unreliable feedback, 
since our hypothesis was about the effect of unreliable feedback on behavioural responses 
and neural representations, and not about the effects of feedback in general.  
To examine potential changes in attention (Kastner et al., 1999, 1998) as a result 
of unreliable feedback, a complementary 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA of the overall V1 
activity (within the voxel mask defined in Section 3.3.9.2. on p.59-60) was performed 
using the same factors (fbtype and time) and covariate as were used in the analyses of 
task performance and pattern distinctness. The dependent variable here was the BOLD 
activity during stimulus presentation (obtained from the T-contrast “all stimuli > 0”; see 
Section 3.3.9.2. on p.59-60 for more) averaged across the task-relevant V1 voxels. 
Lastly, a few control analyses were performed. First of all, to rule out the possibility 
that the differences in performance and pattern representations between the two groups 
could be driven by differences in fixation, a 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on 
the eye-tracking data with the same factors  and covariate as used in the main analyses of 
performance and pattern distinctness. The dependent variable for this analysis was 
computed for each test phase as the percentage of data points that were within the 
fixation window during stimulus presentation. For more details, please refer to Section 
3.3.8 (p.58-59). Next, the responses to the debriefing questions (Section 3.3.7.5., p. 58) 
were analysed. Answers to questions about the awareness of feedback manipulation were 
compared between the two groups (unreliable/ reliable feedback) and correlated with 
the changes in task performance (ΔPercent correct) and pattern distinctness (ΔPattern distinctness). 
Further, to examine whether motivation varies in a manner similar to that of performance 




ratings as the dependent variable and using the same factors (fbtype and time) and 
covariate (orientation discrimination threshold) as used to study performance and 
pattern distinctness. Last of all, performance of the colour-detection task during the 
functional localiser run was compared between the two groups, to see if there was a 
general, task-independent decrease in performance in the unreliable feedback group 
compared to the reliable feedback group, and to verify that participants fixated well 
during the functional localiser (this was critical for proper voxel selection). 
 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Unreliable feedback impairs task performance 
The delivery of unreliable feedback in the intervention phase led to a significant decline 
in discrimination performance, as shown in a two-way mixed-design ANOVA, where the 
between-subject factor feedback type (unreliable vs. reliable) and the within-subject 
factor time (pre- vs. post-intervention) showed a significant interaction effect (F(1, 27) = 
7.26, p = .01; Figure 3.2, p.64). Post-hoc two-tailed one-sample t-tests showed a significant 
decrease in performance after unreliable feedback (M = –6.88, SE = 2.60, t(14) = –2.64,  
p = .02) but not reliable feedback (M = 3.49, SE = 2.73, t(14) = 1.28, p = .22). The effect size 
(Cohen’s d) of the change in performance between the two groups was 0.94. 
  
3.5.2. Unreliable feedback deteriorates stimulus representations in V1 
Neural effects of unreliable feedback were assessed by estimating the distinctness of 
activation patterns in stimulus-responsive voxels of V1 evoked by CW- vs. CCW- rotated 
gratings using cv-MANOVA (Allefeld & Haynes, 2014). FMRI data were available from 29 
participants (unreliable feedback: n = 15, reliable feedback n = 14; see Section 3.3.2., p.52 
for details). The voxel selection process (described in Section 3.3.9.2., p.59-60) yielded 
comparable numbers of V1 voxels in both groups (unreliable feedback: 225.4 ± 13.51, 
reliable feedback: 219.25 ± 17.35 voxels; two-tailed, two-sample t-test: t(27) = 0.28, p = 
.78).  
 In line with our hypothesis, and in striking analogy to the behavioural results, we 




3.3). Again, post-hoc one-sample t-tests (two-tailed) showed that there was a significant 
decrease in pattern distinctness after unreliable feedback (M = –0.04, SE = 0.02, t(14) =  
–2.61, p = .02), but not after reliable feedback (M = 0.02, SE = 0.02, t(13) = 0.98, p = .35).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Behavioural performance across groups (reliable/unreliable feedback) and test phases (pre-
/post-intervention). The bars show mean performances and errorbars show standard errors of the means. 
The lines show performance accuracies for each participant. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Neural pattern distinctness in V1 plotted across groups (reliable/unreliable feedback) and test 
phases (pre-/post-intervention). The bars show the mean pattern distinctness and errorbars show 




The effect size of the change in pattern distinctness between in the two groups was 0.84. 
We note that pattern distinctness appears to differ between groups at baseline (pre-
intervention phase), but this difference was not statistically significant (t(27) = 1.58, p = 
.13, two-tailed two-sample t-test). Please note that like the Mahalanobis distance, the true 
pattern distinctness value can never be below zero; however, as stated by the creators of 
cv-MANOVA, the estimated pattern distinctness derived from finite amounts of data can 
often generate negative values of pattern distinctness when the true value is zero or close 
to it. 
The above results were computed based on mean pattern distinctness obtained 
from each participant and test phase by averaging the estimates across stimulus pairs 
with a common diagonal. To verify that these results were not driven by one stimulus pair 
alone (which would suggest a bias in the results), we used paired t-tests to compare the 
changes in pattern distinctness (ΔPattern distinctness) computed separately for stimulus pairs 
1 and 2. The results revealed that ΔPattern distinctness was comparable across the stimulus 
pairs – for both the group that received unreliable feedback (t(14) = 0.89, p = 0.39; 45° 
reference: M = –0.05, SE = 0.01; 135° reference: M = –0.03, SE = 0.02) and the group that 
received reliable feedback (t (13) = 1.31, p = 0.21; 45° reference: M = –0.003, SE = 0.03; 
135° reference: M = 0.04, SE = 0.02). 
Since we predicted that unreliable feedback was what led to both the deterioration 
in performance and multivariate representations, we tested for a correlation between the 
changes in the two variables (ΔPercent correct and ΔPattern distinctness) in the unreliable feedback 
group using a Pearson correlation analysis (Figure 3.4, p.66). In line with our hypothesis, 
we found a significant positive correlation (r = .66, p = .008, n = 15) between changes in 
performance (ΔPercent correct) and pattern distinctness (ΔPattern distinctness) after unreliable 
feedback. This correlation remained significant after removing two outliers (r = .60, p = 
.03, n = 13), which were identified as the data points deviating from the lower and the 
upper quartiles by more than 1.5*IQR for either ΔPercent correct or ΔPattern distinctness. 
 
Complementary analysis 
A 2x2 mixed-effects ANOVA performed to evaluate overall activity changes in V1 across 
fbtype (unreliable/ reliable) and time (pre-/post-intervention) showed that the 




3.5, p.66). Further, the main effects of feedback type (F(1, 26) = 0.85, p = .36) and time 
(F(1, 26) = 0.39, p = .54) were not significant either.  Thus, the observed effect on pattern 
distinctness was not associated with a change in overall neural responsiveness in V1, thus 
making it unlikely that the deterioration in multivariate representation in V1 resulted 
from changes in overall attention. 
 
Figure 3.4. Correlation between the changes in performance (ΔPercent correct) and pattern distinctness  
(ΔPattern distinctness) for the unreliable feedback group. The triangles represent individual participants, and the 
solid and dashed lines represent regression lines before and after removing the outliers (unfilled triangles), 
respectively. A positive or a negative value on each axis corresponds to an increase or a decrease as a result 
of the feedback intervention, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Overall brain activity plotted across groups (reliable/unreliable feedback) and test phase (pre-
/post-intervention). The bars show the overall brain activity average across participants, and errorbars 




3.5.3. Control analyses 
3.5.3.1. Fixation accuracy did not differ between the groups due to unreliable 
feedback 
We analysed the eye-tracking data to check if the observed effects on performance and 
pattern distinctness could have risen from differences in fixation across time (pre-/post-
intervention) between the two groups (unreliable/ reliable). Data were available from n 
= 22 participants, and fixation accuracies were determined as the percentage of eye 
positions within a circular region of interest (radius = 1.3° visual angle) around the 
fixation dot. Fixation performances were high in general and (in percent, see Figure 3.6) 
were comparable between the unreliable (pre: M = 88.68, SE = 3.43, post: M = 85.09, SE = 
5.51) and the reliable (pre: M = 89.41, SE = 3.00, post: M = 86.25, SE = 9.55) feedback 
groups. A two-way ANOVA with the factors feedback type and time showed neither 
significant main effects (fbtype: F(1, 19) = 0.08, p = .78; time: F(1, 19) = 0.29, p = .60) nor 
a significant interaction effect (F(1, 19) = 0.01, p = .94). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Mean fixation percentage plotted across groups (reliable/unreliable feedback) and test phase 
(pre-/post-intervention). The bars show the mean fixation and the lines show subject-wise estimates. 
 
3.5.3.2. Awareness of feedback manipulation 
To study the influence of the awareness of feedback manipulation on the main results, the 




feedback rated a lower percentage reliability (in answer to question (i) in the Section 
3.3.7.5., p.58) on feedback (M = 53.67, SE = 1.43, df = 14) than those who received reliable 
feedback (M = 90.83, SE = 0.58, df = 14), and the difference between the groups was 
significant (two-tailed, two-sample t-test: t(28) = 6.2, p < .001, Figure 3.7a). Further, the 
answer to the question on whether they suspected the feedback to be manipulated was 
converted to a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is the most unaware and 5 is the most aware; qn, 
(ii) in Section 3.3.7.5., p.58), participants in the unreliable feedback group rated a higher 
degree of awareness to feedback manipulation (M = 3.8, SE = 0.07, df = 14) than the 
reliable feedback group (M = 2.33, SE = 0.07, df = 14), and the group-wise difference was 
significant (two-tailed, two-sample t-test: t(28) = 3.77, p < .001), Figure 3.7b). Lastly, in 
the unreliable feedback group, 13 participants reported the intervention run number 
(between 1 and 8) at which their trust in feedback changed (qn. (iii) in Section 3.3.7.5., 
p.58), the average of which lay close to the middle of the intervention phase (M = 3.73, SE 
= 0.51, Figure 3.7c). 
 
Figure 3.7: (a) Rated reliability (in percent) on feedback, (b) Reported awareness on feedback manipulation 
converted to integer values 1-5 and (c) intervention run number (1-8) in which feedback manipulation was 
detected. The relationship between these variables and (d-f) changes in task performance (ΔPercent correct) and 
(g-i) changes in pattern distinctness (ΔPattern distinctness) for the unreliable feedback group are shown in the 
middle and lower rows, where each circle represents a participant. Errorbars represent standard errors of 




 To examine if the observed results awareness could have indeed influenced the 
observed behavioural and neural changes, each of these measures were correlated with 
ΔPercent correct within the unreliable feedback group. We found that there were no significant 
correlations between ΔPercent correct and the three measures of participants’ knowledge of 
external manipulation, namely the percentage reliability of feedback (r(13) = .12, p = .67, 
Figure 3.7d), the feedback manipulation awareness (r(13) = .13, p = .64, Figure 3.7e) and 
how early the manipulation was detected (performance: r(11) = .18, p = .56, Figure 3.7f). 
Similarly, there was no correlation between ΔPattern distinctness and the same three measures 
– the respective correlations were: percentage reliability (r(13) =  –.09, p = .76, Figure 
3.7g), feedback manipulation awareness (r(13) = .21, p = .46, Figure 3.7h) and how early 
the manipulation was detected (r(11) = .23, p = .45, Figure 3.7i). The lack of correlation 
between the subjective ratings of awareness with the behavioural and neural effects 
suggests that the observed effects of unreliable feedback is robust to the awareness of 
feedback manipulation. Alternatively, participants could have overestimated their 
awareness of feedback manipulation on being specifically asked about it during 
debriefing. 
 
3.5.3.3. Motivation ratings did not differ between groups 
The 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA to test for changes in the percentage rating of motivation 
(answer to qn. (iv) in Section 3.3.7.5., p.58) across the factors time and feedback type 
revealed that neither the interaction effect (F(1, 27) = 0.41, p = .53, Figure 3.8, p.70) not 
the main effect of feedback type (F(1, 27) = 1.59, p = .22) was significant. However, there 
was a main effect of time (F(1, 27) = 4.81, p = .04) explained by the overall decrease in 
motivation from the pre-intervention runs (M = 86, SE = 2.1) to the post-intervention runs 
(M = 69.63, SE = 3.43). Thus, differences in subjective motivation is unlikely to have 
interfered with the task performance during the main experiment. 
 
3.5.3.4. Performance in functional localiser task was comparable between groups  
After the main experiment, there was a functional localiser run in order to select the V1 
voxels that respond best to the visual stimuli. Fixation was critical for this, since the visual 




poorer in the unreliable feedback group, thereby causing the observed differences in the 
pattern distinctness, we analysed performance accuracies in the colour-change detection 
task during the localiser run (Figure 3.9). The analysis revealed that task performances 
were comparable between the unreliable (M = 97.86, SE = 0.3, df = 13) and the reliable (M 
= 95.33, SE = 0.61, df = 14) feedback groups. Note that one participant reported not having 
performed the colour-change detection task during debriefing and was hence excluded 
from this post-hoc analysis.  
 
Figure 3.8: Motivation ratings in the pre- and post-intervention phases for the unreliable and reliable 




Figure 3.9: Mean performance in the colour-change detection task performed during the functional localiser 





This indicates that the voxel selection procedure was not noisier in the unreliable 
feedback group and also that the debilitating effects of unreliable feedback on 
performance could be task-specific. 
 
3.6. Discussion 
Taken together, the results from this study that the induction of a belief about uncertainty 
using unreliable feedback is associated with a deterioration of perceptual task 
performance and concomitant changes in the neural representation of stimulus 
information in V1.  
While the observed decline in task performance is in line with previous work on 
unreliable feedback (Herzog & Fahle, 1997, 1999; Vuvan et al., 2018), the neural 
mechanisms had not been studied before. Here we show that in parallel with the 
deterioration in performance, there is also a deterioration in the representation of the 
corresponding grating stimuli in V1. Moreover, individuals with larger performance 
impairments after unreliable feedback also showed larger drops in V1 pattern 
distinctness, and vice versa. According to predictive coding theories of hierarchical 
cortical processing, bottom-up sensory prediction error signals are weighted by the 
precision of these signals in superficial cortical layers (Adams et al., 2013). In line with 
this idea, some fMRI studies have also reported activity linked to precision-weighted 
prediction errors in sensory areas of the brain (Iglesias et al., 2013; Stefanics, Stephan, & 
Heinzle, 2019). The precision, encoded by the post-synaptic gain of the neurons 
transmitting the bottom-up signals, is thought to be under the influence of top-down 
projections (Kanai, Komura, Shipp, & Friston, 2015).  We suggest that our finding of 
reduced distinctness of fMRI signal patterns may be due to a decrease in the precision-
weighting of sensory information in V1, most likely mediated by top-down signalling of 
learned beliefs regarding the reliability of the sensory information. 
 Two limitations of our study are (1) the small sample size, given the between-
group design and (2) the overall high awareness of feedback manipulation during 
debriefing. Since this study was novel in its design and approach, a formal sample size 
calculation could not be performed. Further, the between-group design of this study was 




which was reported by a few participants of Study I. In spite of this, participants who 
received unreliable feedback did report noticeably less reliability in it during debriefing. 
But since these reliability ratings did not correlate with the observed changes in 
performance or pattern distinctness at all, it is unlikely that they could have directly 
influenced our main results. However, to overcome these limitations, future studies 
should perform such experiments with a larger sample and at a higher task difficulty – 
although it is to be noted that task difficulty comes at the price of the smaller multivariate 
effects – since as the task difficulty increases, the physical properties of stimuli (and 
consequently their neural representations) are likely to get more similar to each other, 
which in turn would reduce their multivariate decodability and dissimilarity. For now, we 
recommend that our results be treated as proof-of concept.  
Thus, using unreliable feedback as a tool to induce top-down beliefs about 
uncertainty, we show that the weighing of sensory information in perceptual inference is 
implemented at the earliest stages of cortical sensory processing and that this can be 






































4.1. Summary of findings 
This thesis set out to investigate the mechanisms by which feedback reliability influences 
perception and behaviour. We used Bayesian inference theories to accomplish this. We 
proposed that delivering unreliable feedback (that had a chance-level validity) to 
perceptual decisions would lead to the down-weighing of sensory information. As a result, 
we hypothesised that there would be a decline in task performance and an increased 
reliance on prior beliefs. Further, we predicted that unreliable feedback would decrease 
the distinctness of stimulus representation in sensory areas of the brain. As a secondary 
hypothesis, we also predicted that the metacognitive awareness about performance 
would decrease along with performance. Lastly, we modelled the effects of unreliable 
feedback on performance and reliance on prior beliefs using a Bayesian learning scheme 
and logistic regression. 
The hypotheses were tested in two empirical studies, described in Chapters 2 and 
3 of the thesis. The studies comprised three experiments and one simulation in total. Both 
the studies showed evidence in favour of our predictions. The findings are summarised 
below:  
(1) Decrease in task performance – In both the studies, unreliable feedback led to a 
sustained decrease in task performance accuracy even after the delivery of unreliable 
feedback stopped – irrespective of whether reliable feedback was present (Study I) or 
not (Study II) in the period afterwards.  
 
(2) Increase in cue-congruence – Data from Study I showed that after periods with 
unreliable performance feedback, perceptual inference shifted towards prior beliefs, 
even though the sensory information and the prior-stimulus association remained the 
same. 
 
(3)  Decreased pattern distinctness in V1 – Neuroimaging data from Study II showed 
that unreliable feedback led to a decrease in the distinctness of multi-voxel activity 
patterns corresponding to visual stimuli in V1, and that this decrease was 





(4)  Decreased metacognitive awareness – Experiment 2 of Study I showed a clear 
decrease in metacognitive awareness during, but not after, the delivery of unreliable 
feedback. 
 
(5) A Bayesian observer model predicts the empirical results – Data from 1000 
artificial subjects, in whom the unreliable feedback delivery was simulated by the 
misclassification of data points in Study I, also resulted in reduced task performance 
and a higher cue-congruence. This paralleled the observations from the two 
behavioural experiments of Study I, thus supporting our hypothesis that unreliable 
feedback leads to the down-weighing of sensory data and the compensatory up-
weighing of prior beliefs.  
 
 
4.2. Novelty of results 
The focus of this thesis was to understand how feedback manipulation could affect low-
level perception over time. Similar to some of the previously reported studies (Herzog & 
Fahle, 1997; Vannucci et al., 2011; Vuvan et al., 2018; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), we 
provided random feedback with chance-level validity in order to maximise uncertainty 
about the reliability of sensory information. In both the studies, such feedback was 
delivered in dedicated experimental phases called intervention runs, and their sustained 
effects were examined in the following phases called test runs. To control for general 
effects of time and the exposure to stimuli, control sessions were included in both the 
studies, reliable feedback replaced unreliable feedback. 
In both the studies, unreliable feedback led to a sustained decrease in task 
performance accuracy even after the unreliable feedback stopped – irrespective of the 
presence (Study I) or absence (Study II) of predictive cues and reliable feedback in these 
periods. This sustained decrease contradicts some of the previous studies that reported 
improvements in performance once unreliable feedback stopped and reliable feedback 
was restored (Aberg & Herzog, 2012; Herzog & Fahle, 1997, 1999). However, our data are 
not directly comparable to these studies because of methodological differences: For 
instance, in Study I, the test runs, i.e., the runs that preceded and succeeded unreliable 




interfered with the recovery of performance that occurred in the previous studies in 
which a reliable feedback phase followed an unreliable feedback phase. Further, in Study 
II, feedback was withheld in the test runs and this could have further slowed down the 
recovery of task performance. Moreover, in some previous studies, difficulty levels were 
higher than in our experiments (e.g., 65% in Herzog & Fahle, 1997), which left more room 
for performance improvements and may have led to the stronger effect of reliable 
feedback (Liu et al., 2010, 2012). 
In Study I, we further showed that unreliable feedback led to a higher reliance on 
cues, with an increase in the number of errors in the incorrectly predicted (i.e., 
incongruently cued) trials. This agrees with the Bayesian inference account of perception, 
according to which when the sensory data becomes less precise, the posterior – and 
consequently perceptual decisions – shift towards the prior beliefs (Adams et al., 2013). 
Similar results have also been observed in a previous study where the addition of noise 
to feedback shifted motor responses towards prior beliefs (Körding & Wolpert, 2004). 
A simulated Bayesian observer model, which forward-modelled unreliable 
feedback as incorrect updating of internal likelihood distributions, replicated the effects 
of impaired performance and increased reliance on prior information. Here, in the 
simulated intervention phases, unreliable feedback was implemented as 
misclassifications of half of the stimuli. This led to the updating of likelihood distributions 
corresponding to the two stimulus categories with incorrect samples. In the simulated 
test phases, additional binary information was included on each trial (analogous to the 
cues used in the behavioural experiments of Study I). The perceptual decision-making was 
implemented in the simulations using a logistic regression scheme, where the weights 
given to priors and sensory data were re-estimated after each simulated intervention 
phase which had either unreliable or reliable feedback. These weights were then used to 
predict participants’ choices. Such a scheme resulted in performance and cue-congruence 
changes (unreliable vs. reliable feedback) that were very similar to the behavioural data 
from experiments 1 and 2 in Study I. 
The observed results are best supported by the explanation that sensory data gets 
down-weighed as a result of unreliable feedback. This process is shown schematically in 
Figure 4.1: The likelihood distributions corresponding to the stimuli – for example, the 




of continuous misclassification by means of unreliable feedback. This causes the 
likelihood estimate of the stimulus within the correct category to decrease (blue curve 
corresponding to 45° in Figure 4.1) and for the likelihood estimate within the incorrect 
category to increase (red curve corresponding to 135° in Figure 4.1), thus resulting in a 
higher number of erroneous decisions. In presence of priors, the brain would then 
attempt to compensate for the noisier sensory representations by making more use of 
available priors.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: An illustration of how unreliable feedback updates the likelihood (LL) representations using an 
example task based on experiment 2 in Study I. The task was to identify whether the presented visual stimuli 
consisted of orientations 45° or 135°. Corresponding likelihood distributions are shown by the blue and red 
distributions (solid lines), respectively. Faulty feedback would repeatedly misclassify the representations, 
making them less precise over time (dotted blue and red lines) and resulting in a lower likelihood estimate 
for the correct stimulus category (45°, blue) and a higher likelihood estimate for the incorrect stimulus 
category (135°, red). 
 
Study II further sought to understand whether the unreliable feedback would 
influence representations of stimuli in the sensory cortex. The primary visual cortex or 
V1 is most sensitive to the low-level properties of stimuli such as contrasts and spatial 
frequency that are critical to orientation discrimination (Avidan et al., 2002; Boynton, 




of sensory representations of stimuli in V1 would decrease as a result of the increase in 
sensory uncertainty due to unreliable feedback. Although several studies have shown the 
effects of sensory uncertainty on stimulus representations in sensory areas of the brain, 
uncertainty in these studies was induced by altering the physical properties of stimuli 
(Darcy et al., 2019; Hebart et al., 2012; Ludwig et al., 2016). Here, we kept the visual 
stimulation (i.e., stimulus orientations) constant and studied the effects of top-down 
beliefs about sensory uncertainty on stimulus representations. The results of Study II 
showed that inducing beliefs about uncertainty can indeed decrease the precision of 
stimulus representation in the sensory cortex. 
Our analysis of the confidence data in Study I (experiment 2) revealed that 
confidence decreased during the delivery of unreliable feedback (intervention runs), but 
not afterwards (test runs). While the immediate effects are in line with a previous study 
(Vuvan et al., 2018), the sustained effects of unreliable feedback need to be investigated 
further since the analysis of session-wise slopes of the test runs indicated that there could 
be sustained effects of unreliable feedback over time on confidence too – while it 
increased over time in the reliable feedback session, it remained unchanged in the 
unreliable feedback session. Further, the presence of reliable feedback in the test runs in 
Study I could have further led to a quick recovery of confidence after each intervention 
run, thereby reducing the size of the sustained effects of unreliable feedback on 
confidence. Confidence is a well-known indicator of metacognitive awareness of one’s 
own performance (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Stankov, 2000; Yeung & Summerfield, 
2012) and has been shown to parallel changes in performance (Daniel & Pollmann, 2012; 
Guggenmos et al., 2016; Hebart et al., 2016; Vuvan et al., 2018). Our results showed that 
in line with performance, confidence too decreased during the delivery of unreliable 
feedback compared to reliable feedback. Recent studies have also highlighted another role 
of confidence – that of a learning signal (Daniel & Pollmann, 2012; Guggenmos et al., 2016; 
Hebart et al., 2016). Thus, it is possible that unreliable feedback impairs performance as 
a result of the decrease in the learning signal provided by confidence. To further explore 
this possibility, and to further understand the difference between the slopes for reliable 
and unreliable feedback, the effects of unreliable feedback on confidence and 
performance should be investigated in the absence of any feedback in the test runs.  
Lastly, several non-perceptual mechanisms that could have influenced the 




conditions and post-hoc analyses. The control condition with reliable feedback accounted 
for general learning and fatigue effects that result from performing the task for an 
extended period. Further, we monitored fixation actively (i.e., trials did not start unless 
there was fixation; see Study I) or passively (post-hoc comparison of fixation accuracies; 
see Study II), and this helped to exclude the possibility that eye movements led to the 
observed effects of unreliable feedback.  Further, although there was a moderate 
awareness of feedback manipulation, higher awareness did not enhance our results. 
Similarly, motivation too remained comparable between reliable and unreliable feedback. 
Lastly, there was no change in the overall activity of the V1 voxels or in the performance 
of an independent task performed after the main experiment in Study II, thus rendering 
unlikely the possibility that a general decrease in attention contributed to the observed 
effects of unreliable feedback (Kastner et al., 1999, 1998).  
 
4.3. Alternative accounts of the effects of unreliable feedback 
As described in the previous section, our results were interpreted within the Bayesian 
inference framework, where we propose that stimulus distributions would get 
progressively more imprecise as a result of unreliable feedback on task performance. 
However, two other mechanisms could have alternatively occurred, which are discussed 
below. 
First, since the delivery of unreliable feedback implies that there would be fewer 
trials with valid feedback compared to reliable feedback, we could observe a smaller 
improvement in performance.  For instance, if reliable performance would lead to a 10% 
increase in performance, unreliable feedback would lead to a 5% improvement. Thus, 
although there would still be a relative decrease in performance compared to reliable 
feedback, the overall change would still be positive, i.e., a small performance improvement 
across time. However, this prediction does not consider the debilitating effect of the trials 
with invalid feedback, which could potentially undo the learning from the valid feedback 
trials.  Further, for unreliable feedback to have any effect at all on behaviour, participants 
need to be unaware of the manipulation (or else they would simply ignore the feedback), 
and for this, it is important to (1) intersperse valid and invalid feedback randomly across 
trials within intervention runs, and (2) use a sufficiently challenging task. When using a 




benefit from the valid feedback trials, since it would be difficult to determine the exact 
trials in which feedback was valid or invalid.  
A second mechanism for unreliable feedback would be one in which it provides no 
net useful information, resulting in the absence of any change in task performance. This 
would occur if the beneficial effects of valid feedback trials were cancelled out by the mis-
learning occurring in the invalid feedback trials, since the valid and invalid trials were 
equal in number. This would result in the absence of any change in performance. In line 
with this possibility, a few previous studies that had used unreliable or random feedback 
have shown that it does not change the overall performance accuracy across time (Herzog 
& Fahle, 1997; Vannucci et al., 2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).  
Both of these accounts consider only trial-by-trial updating of stimulus 
distributions, where correctly classified trials improve the likelihood estimates of stimuli 
and incorrectly classified trials deteriorate the likelihood estimates. They do not take into 
account an important adaptive property of the brain – namely its ability to actively make 
inferences about the environment and its reliability (Adams et al., 2013; Behrens, 
Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; De Ridder, Vanneste, & Freeman, 2014; Schmack 
et al., 2016).  This phenomenon has been formalised as the active inference theory, 
according to which the brain actively adapts behaviour so as to minimise sensory 
prediction errors (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011). The shift in responses towards priors 
along with the general decrease in task performance seen in our studies suggests active 
re-weighting by the brain in an attempt to minimise errors. It is thus possible that in an 
attempt to reduce the large prediction error signals continuously evoked by unreliable 
feedback, the brain down-weighs sensory data and up-weighs prior information, resulting 
in the increased prior-dependent behaviour seen in Study I. 
 
4.4. Feedback validity and learning 
The effects of varying feedback validity on perception and learning have been studied 
before. However, based on the research questions and the experimental designs (stimuli, 
task difficulty, duration etc.), the results varied vastly, ranging from deteriorations in 
performance to absence of improvements  to improvements (Aberg & Herzog, 2012; Choi 




Vuvan et al., 2018; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). In particular, how feedback was 
manipulated appears to have influenced the results. For example, Shibata et al. (2009) 
reported an improvement in performance on providing feedback that indicated a higher 
performance improvement than there actually was, with the idea that the learning rate is 
proportionate to perceived improvement in performance. However, when providing 
feedback with such a bias, the overall attention and task motivation could have also been 
high, which could have also helped with the learning. Further, it needs to be kept in mind 
that perceptual learning can occur even in the absence of feedback; hence it is possible 
that the degree of feedback manipulation in this case was simply not sufficient to counter 
the naturally occurring feedback-based learning. The other study that reported 
performance improvement (Choi & Watanabe, 2012) provided feedback that was invalid, 
but still informative. In this study, the participants were trained in the task in such a way 
that the invalid-feedback trials suggested the presence of a previously learnt stimulus, 
leading to its memory retrieval every time such feedback was provided.  
Studies that have used unreliable “random” feedback across all stimuli similar to 
our approach have reported either a decrease in performance or no change in 
performance (Herzog & Fahle, 1997; Vannucci et al., 2011; Vuvan et al., 2018; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008). In the study that reported no change in performance too (Herzog & Fahle, 
1997), there was still a relative decrease in performance compared to reliable feedback. 
Further, we also measured changes in confidence and cue congruence, and all these 
measures indicated that unreliable feedback caused a deficit in sensory processing. Since 
perceptual learning is usually studied at a much slower timescale, these effects need to be 
studied over longer periods to understand better about the extent of these deficits and 
the time taken for recovery. 
The studies in this thesis use the same stimuli and task to induce top-down beliefs 
about sensory uncertainty (i.e., deliver unreliable feedback) and to measure its effects, 
and based on the data from Study II, we can conclude that unreliable feedback does affect 
information processing in V1. However, can unreliable feedback influence perception 
across tasks? Two previous studies have shown evidence in favour of this – the delivery 
of unreliable feedback in two-choice tasks did increase pattern identification in 
subsequent object-identification tasks (Vannucci et al., 2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
This seems compatible with real-world learning, where we seldom encounter the same 




presented in the same (visual) domain and are thus likely to share some of the neural 
machinery. To test if unreliable feedback leads the brain to down-weigh all sensory data, 
different modalities need to be used to induce uncertainty with unreliable feedback and 
to measure its effects. 
 
4.5. Was reliable feedback a good control? 
The usage of reliable feedback in the control sessions instead of omitting feedback could 
lead to the suggestion that the observed effects of unreliable feedback were due to the 
absence of reliable feedback, rather than the presence of unreliable feedback.  In other 
words, the former argument would predict that beliefs about the non-reliability of 
sensory data (or the volatility of the environment) were probably not induced, and we 
would never know this since our control condition was not “no feedback”, but rather 
“valid feedback” – and valid feedback is known to improve performance relative to no 
feedback (Herzog & Fahle, 1997; Seitz et al., 2006). In spite of not having a “no feedback” 
condition in our studies, we find this above argument highly unlikely based on the results 
of behavioural performance in our studies. In our studies, performance decreases as a 
result of feedback manipulation, and previous studies which have used similar grating 
stimuli have already shown that learning could occur even in the absence of feedback at 
the at 80% performance threshold (Guggenmos et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2010, 2012). Hence, 
the deterioration in performance suggests that the absence of reliable feedback is not the 
only mechanism at play, but that a debilitating mechanism is further involved in this. 
Nevertheless, to understand the extent of differences between the absence of feedback 
and unreliable feedback, and how it relates to reliable feedback, future studies should 
directly compare the differences between these three conditions.  
 
4.6. Sensory uncertainty and psychosis 
Recently, theories of Bayesian learning in the brain and its potential pathological 
aberrations have inspired several models of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia 
(Adams et al., 2013; Corlett, Honey, Krystal, & Fletcher, 2011; Diaconescu, Hauke, & 




false inferences regarding the environmental causes of sensory input data might lead to 
an unstable representation of the environment, as a result of which it would appear 
unpredictable and potentially threatening. While this notion may account for a variety of 
cognitive and perceptual aberrations observed in schizophrenia, it cannot easily explain 
one of its key features, namely, the stability of delusional beliefs, which are typically 
resistant to contradictory evidence. Consistent with the clinical importance of fixed 
delusional beliefs, it has been shown experimentally that individuals with growing 
delusion proneness exhibit a stronger tendency to perceive ambiguous stimuli in a 
manner congruent with induced prior beliefs (Schmack et al., 2013). This might engender 
a cycle of impaired sensory processing and compensatory strengthening of delusional 
beliefs, which might in turn shape perception in a belief-congruent (delusional) manner. 
Results from Study I demonstrate that the impairments in sensory learning induced by 
feedback manipulation may indeed engender the enhanced usage of prior beliefs in order 
to compensate for suboptimal sensory models as suggested previously (Corlett et al., 
2019; Sterzer et al., 2018). Further, the results from Study II show that the induction of 
beliefs about reliability can manifest at the earliest levels of cortical processing, in line 
with a few with previous studies that have shown impairments in sensory processing in 
schizophrenia (Dierks et al., 1999; Gruetzner et al., 2013; Seymour et al., 2013; Silverstein, 
Demmin, & Bednar, 2017; Yoon et al., 2008). Thus, unreliable feedback could potentially 
be a useful tool to study the symptoms of aberrant perception by systematically impairing 
sensory precision and consequently studying its effects on perceptual inference.  
 
4.7. Limitations  
The focus of the current study was to gather a mechanistic understanding as to the effect 
of unreliable feedback on perception and behaviour, and one of our primary goals was to 
investigate the balance between sensory data and prior beliefs. To this end, we showed in 
Study I that behaviour shifted towards the priors (predictive cues) after phases with 
unreliable feedback on sensory data. In this study, the priors and unreliable feedback 
were presented in separate phases or runs. This separation was essential to prevent 
participants from strategically making decisions by attending to the cue alone and 
ignoring the sensory stimuli – which a participants had reported doing in a pilot version 




However, this separation of priors and feedback would rarely occur in actuality. Real-
world scenarios might more likely resemble Körding and Wolpert (2004), where visual 
feedback guided motor action, and prior and feedback precision was built into this one 
entity, namely the visual feedback. However in this study too, the reduction in feedback 
precision led to prior-congruent visuo-motor learning. Thus, in spite of the controlled 
setting of our studies, our results mirrored the behaviour seen in visuo-motor learning 
when imprecise feedback was provided. 
 A second potential limitation could be that participants sometimes reported 
having detected the feedback manipulation in the debriefing questionnaire, and this could 
have led them to place less weight on feedback. A possible reason could be the disparity 
between the apparent performance indicated by the feedback and their true performance. 
The feedback manipulation conditions delivered positive feedback in only half of the trials 
(this would inevitably occur when responses are reversed in half of the trials in two-
choice tasks) indicating to participants that they were performing poorly. On the other 
hand, their actual performance threshold was 80% (which was done to prevent a floor 
effect towards the end of the sessions). Future studies of unreliable feedback could better 
mask the external manipulation from participants, for instance by matching their 
apparent performance (number of trials which resulted in positive feedback) with their 
actual performance (actual number of correct responses) or by increasing the overall task 
difficulty.  
In spite of several participants having indicated awareness of feedback 
manipulation during debriefing, there were still significant effects of unreliable feedback 
in both studies. Further, these ratings of awareness did not show consistent correlations 
with the objective measures (performance, cue-congruence, pattern distinctness etc.). 
This suggests that the awareness ratings themselves might have been noisy. The ratings 
were always collected at the end of the experiment for each participant and were thus 
based on their memory – which could have been noisy and often biased by the “Aha!” 
effect that occurs on suggestive questioning (Loftus, 2003; Topolinski & Reber, 2010). 
However, asking about feedback validity during the experiment would increase the 
chances of participants guessing external manipulation of feedback, which in turn would 
influence their perceptual decisions during the experiment. To get better indices of the 
awareness of feedback manipulation, future studies could include open-ended questions 




feedback could have been manipulated (such as occurs when, for instance, asking for a 
reliability rating from participants). 
Lastly, a trade-off was made in the fMRI study (Study II) between task difficulty 
and stimulus discriminability – the counter-clockwise and clockwise gratings with a 
common reference whose neural representations were compared, may have shared a 
large neural population. This might have reduced stimulus discriminability and 
consequently the size of our effects. In spite of this, we could observe the changes in 
pattern representations as a result of unreliable feedback. However, owing to the small 
sample-size and the between-group design used in this study, the results should be 




The primary goal of this thesis was to understand how the brain would acclimate itself to 
an uncertain environment in which the sensory information itself does not change but 
rather how the environment responds to our perception of it. It is well-known that 
perceptual decision-making is influenced by context – for example, being given 
background information of a crime influences fingerprint-matching (Dror, Péron, Hind, & 
Charlton, 2005). Hunger and poverty have long been known to change perceptions of food 
and money, respectively (Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Levine, Chein, & Murphy, 1942). 
Several of the biases can now be successfully explained by the Bayesian perceptual 
inference theory. Here we used the Bayesian inference approach in combination with 
behavioural and neuroimaging studies to explain how perception changes in an unreliable 
environment. Such an environment was simulated by externally manipulating 
performance feedback. We hypothesised that providing such unreliable feedback to 
perceptual decisions would impair our reliance on sensory evidence and consequently 
shift the balance between prior beliefs and sensory data. Although previous studies have 
explored these processes to varying extents, a mechanistic understanding in relation to 
adaptive perceptual inference was missing. The results from our experiments revealed 
that in an unreliable environment, sensory data get down-weighed, leading to impaired 




compensatory shift towards prior beliefs. Further, observers seem to be aware of these 
behavioural changes, since a decline in subjective confidence too was observed.  
Taken together, the studies in this thesis show that the induction of beliefs about 
the environmental reliability of sensory information systematically changes the way in 
which we perceive sensory information. This could be used as a framework to study how 
beliefs about sensory uncertainty can cause the brain to dynamically shift its balance 
between sensory evidence and prior beliefs. Further, unreliable feedback can be used to 
model neurological or psychiatric illnesses that are associated with aberrant perceptual 
inference. I hope that the work described in this thesis serves as a good basis for future 




4.9. Future directions 
This study is the first step towards understanding how perceptual inference adapts to 
unreliable feedback from the environment. We have successfully shown that Bayesian 
inference theories can be used to interpret this. However, several questions remain, which 
should be investigated in future studies: 
(1) Unreliable feedback vs. absence of feedback – The decrease in task performance 
across time compared to baseline indicates a negative effect of unreliable feedback 
that it is unlikely to be merely due to the absence of feedback. However, a direct 
comparison between the unreliable feedback and no-feedback conditions is 
necessary to establish this. 
 
(2) Long-term effects of unreliable feedback – The studies described in this thesis, 
together with a few previous studies, have shown that unreliable feedback leads to 
sustained effects even after its delivery stops. Studying the changes in performance 
on following days and/or weeks would help us to understand the long-term effects of 
unreliable feedback on learning and memory consolidation. This in turn, will give us 






(3) Stimulus representation in V1 in presence of a prior – To understand the neural 
mechanisms underlying the increase in cue-congruence observed in Study I, an fMRI 
study could be designed with predictive priors in addition to sensory data. Previous 
studies have already shown that expectations influence stimulus representations in 
sensory areas (Kok et al., 2012; Schmack et al., 2013). Since unreliable feedback 
reduces grating stimulus precision and representational accuracy in V1, it is possible 
that neural stimulus representations, like behavioural choices, would become more 
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